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INTRODUCTION

Data is the new oil of today's economy--so claim policy makers,
commentators, and industry analysts.' In a data-driven economy, there
is enormous value in the data generated and collected by humans and
machines-both consciously and subconsciously. 2 As the European
Commission estimated, the value of the European data economy will
more than double from E257 billion in 2014 to 6643 billion by 2020.
Both the McKinsey Global Institute and the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development have released pioneering studies
documenting the many opportunities provided by big data analytics
and the emerging data-driven economy.4 The increase in data value,

1.
"'Data is the new oil', a phrase that is common currency among leaders in industry,
commerce, and politics, is usually attributed to Clive Humby in 2006, the originator of Tesco's
customer loyalty card." DAwN E. HOLMEs, BIG DATA: A VERY SHORT INTRoDUCTION 20
(2017); see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUION THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LivE, WORK, AND THINK 16 (2013) (describing

data as "the oil of the information economy"); Teresa Scassa, Data Ownership 1 (Ctr. for Int'l
Governance Innovation, CIGI Paper No. 187, 2018), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/
files/documents/Paper%20no.187_2.pdf ('he commercial value and importance of data is
such that they have been referred to as the 'new oil' ... ."); The World's Most Valuable
Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, EcoNOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.

com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worldsmost-valuable-resource (stating that data have "spawn[ed] a lucrative, fast-growing industry
[the same way as oil], prompting antitrust regulators to step in to restrain those who control its
flow'). See generally ROB KrICHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA
INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014) (providing a comprehensive discussion of

the data revolution).
2.

See Commission Communicationon "Buik ing a EuropeanDataEconomy," at 4,

COM (2017) 9 final (Oct. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Commission Communication]("[Als the datadriven transformation reaches into the economy and society, ever-increasing amounts of data
are generated by machines or processes based on emerging technologies, such as the Internet
of Things ... ,the factories of the future and autonomous connected systems.").
3.

Id at 2.

4.
JAMES MANYucA ET AL., McKINSEY GLOB. INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXr FRONTIER
FOR INNOVATION, COMPETION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2011); ORG. FOR EcoN. Co-OPERATION

& DEv., DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION: BIG DATA FOR GROwifH AND WELL-BEING 403-38

(2015). As the report from the McKinsey Global Institute observed.
[I]f US health care could use big data creatively and effectively to drive efficiency
and quality, we estimate that the potential value from data in the sector could be
more than $300 billion in value every year, two-thirds of which would be in the form
of reducing national health care expenditures by about 8 percent In the private
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and the attendant explosion of data,s was the result of a confluence of
factors-most notably "the rise of 'smart manufacturing', . . . the
economic potential of 'mining' Big Data[,] ... and the promise of the
Internet of Things."
With the arrival of big data analytics, data have also become
highly valuable for uses other than what data producers or collectors
initially intended.! Because data can be used alone or in combination
with previously nonexistent or inaccessible data,' a considerable part
of the value of the generated data now lies in their "option value," not
intended value.' In an environment with ubiquitous communication,
the prolifeation of Intemet-of-Things devices,' 0 and the drastic reduction
sector, we estimate, for example, that a retailer using big data to the full has the
potential to increase its operating margin by more than 60 percent.
MANYIKA E AL., supra, at 2.
5.
See HOLMEs, supra note 1, at 1-13'(discussing the data explosion); MAYERSCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 70-72 (discussing the transformation brought about
by the "data deluge"); Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual) Property Right for NonPersonalData?An Economic Analyis, 65 GEwERBaCHERREcKIscHuIzuNDURHEmERREcrT,
INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRURINT] 989, 992 (2016) (Ger.) ('The amount of collected data is
increasing exponentially, and it is widely expected that through the spreading of sensor
technology and the 'internet of things' this trend will continue for the foreseeable future.').
6.
P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Against 'Data Property,' in 3 KRTrKA: ESSAYS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 48, 51-52 (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 2018).
7.
See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUIGER, supra note 1, at 153 ("[In a big-data age,
most innovative secondary uses haven't been imagined when the data is first collected."); Mark
Burdon &Mark Andrejevic, Big Data in the Sensor Society, in BIG DATA Is NOT A MONoLITH
61, 69 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al. eds., 2016) (noting that the value in data "is provided by the
fact that personal data can be aggregated with that of countless other users (and things) in order
to unearth unanticipated but actionable research findings"); Margaret Foster Riley, Big Data,
HlIPAA, and the Common Rule: 7me for Big Change?, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND
BioEDIIcs 251, 251 (L Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) ("The analysis of Big Data related to
healthcare is often for a different purpose than the purpose for which the data were originally
collected.").
8.
See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 107 ("Sometimes the
dormant value can only be unleashed by combining one dataset with another, perhaps a very
different one."); JEROME H. REICHMAN Er AL., GOVERNING DIGITALLY INTEGRATED GENETIC
RESOURCES, DATA, AND LrlERATURE: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR A
REDESIGNED MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONs 322 (2016) ("In th[e] new research

environment, scientists increasingly rely on automated knowledge discovery tools to mine and
recombine vast amounts of data and literature that are flowing at rates that exceed the capacity
of a single investigator to comprehend and manage."); Burdon & Andrejevic, supra note 7, at
63 ("[E]ven seemingly irrelevant data may become relevant at some point in the future-when
they can be correlated with new data sets.").
9.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUIER, supmanote 1, at 122; see id at 99 (In the digital
age, data shed its role of supporting transactions and often became the good itself that was
traded. In a big-data world... [d]ata's value shifts from its primary use to its potential future
uses.").
10. As defined in the 2014 big data report from the Obama Administration:
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of data storage costs," it is only logical that machines produce or
collect as many data as they can.' 2 After all, it is much better to err
on the side of overgeneration." As Woodrow Hartzog wrote succinctly,
The "Internet of Things" is a term used to describe the ability of devices to
communicate with each other using embedded sensors that are linked through wired
and wireless networks. These devices could include your thermostat, your car, or a
pill you swallow so the doctor can monitor the health of your digestive tract. These
connected devices use the Internet to transmit, compile, and analyze data.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES

2

(2014); see also Commission Staff Working Document on the FreeFlow ofDataandEmerging
Issues of the European Data Economy, at 41, SWD (2017) 2 final [hereinafter Commission
Staff Working Document] ('[Intemet of Things] is a wide-ranging ecosystem of physical
objects connected to the Internet, capable of identifying themselves and communicating data
to other objects with the help of a communication network for digital processing."). See
generally SAMUEL GREENGARD, THE INTERNET OF THINGs (2015) (discussing the Internet of
Things). One commentator captured vividly the drastically increased production and
collection of data in what commentators have referred to as the Internet of Things today:
The increase of data creation is further catalysed by new technologies and
connected devices; it is often referred to as the "internet of things" .... Wearables
connected to a smartphone create data to people's physical activity. Data related to
heart rates, steps taken in a certain time frame, etc., are created[.] Smart thermostats
in our homes use sensors, real-time weather forecasts, and the actual activity [in]
homes during the day to reduce energy usage. Networked cars have multiple
sensors, steering devices and technology that can communicate with other devices
outside the car. A networked car might communicate details about traffic, favourite
routes and road conditions to the car owner, manufacturer, navigation service
providers, insurers, construction authorities and other companies.... Household
devices such as refrigerators may be able to order food products when scanning that
we rnm low ofour milk supply.
Thomas J. Farkas, DataCreatedby the Internet ofThings: The New Gold Without Ownershi?,
23 REVISTA LA PRoPIEDAD INMATERIAL 5, 6 (2017) (footnote omitted).
11.
See ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supranote 10, at 4 (noting the "declining cost
of collection, storage, and processing of data"); MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supranote
1, at 106 ("Some companies may have collected data, used it once (if at all), and just kept it
around because of low storage cost-in 'data tombs,' as data scientists call the places where
such old info resides.").
12. See Burdon & Andrejevic, supranote 7, at 74 ('This is the business model of the
contemporary commercial Internet collect all available data because they might come in handy
for new and unanticipated uses."). Commentators have noted that the increase in data
collection is not only different in degree, but also different in kInd. See GREENGARD, supra
note 10, at 64 ("When hundreds or thousands of sensors connect to one another, it's possible
to view data at a much higher resolution and understand relationships and patterns in a much
more detailed way."); Scott R. Peppet, Regulatingthe Internet of Things: FirstSteps Toward
Managing Discrimination Privacy Security, and Consent 93 TEX. L. REv. 85, 93 (2014)
("Computer scientists have long known that the phenomenon of 'sensor fusion' dictates that
the information from two disconnected sensing devices can, when combined, create greater
information than that of either device in isolation.").
See Burdon & Andrejevic, supranote 7, at 62 (noting "the advent of the 'sensor
13.
society,' . . . in which a growing range of spaces and places, objects and devices, continuously
collect data about anything and everything").
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"In the world of big data, more is always better."14 Conscious of this
increasing eagerness to produce or collect data, some commentators
suggested that the Internet of Things has now slowly become the
"Internet of Everything."15
In October 2017, the European Commission proposed a new data
producer's right for nonpersonal, anonymized machine-generated
data.16 Driven in large part by the automotive industry and strongly
supported by German commentators, 17 this proposal called for the
creation in data producers a "right to use and authorise the use of non14.
WoODRow HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLuEPRiNT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 51 (2018); see also MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra

note 1, at 100 ("[In the age of big data, all data will be regarded as valuable, in and of itself.").
15. See Burdon & Andrejevic, supra note 7, at 72 ("The seemingly never-ending
improvements in what sensors can detect, combined with the density of sensor implementation,
will lead to ever-increasing forms [of] identification and monitoring. Sensor density, the
combining of an increasing number of sensors in single objects and environments, will lead to
the generation of data about everything, everywhere."); Fred H. Cate, Big Data, Consent, and
the Future ofDataProtection,in BIG DATA IS NOT A MONOUTH, supra note 7, at 3, 3 ("[D]ata
are collected by sensors, which surround us in smartphones, tablets, laptops, wearable
technologies and sensor-enabled clothing, RFID-equipped passports, cars, homes, and
offices."); Yanm Mdninre & Ija Rudyk, The FourthIndustrialRevolutionfom the European
Patent Office Perspective, in INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENcE AND BIG DATA 29, 33 (Xavier Seuba et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE] ('The variety and ubiquity of the sensors
embedded in connected objects make it possible to collect data of virtually any type and origin
and to aggregate them into 'big data,' the raw material of [the fourth industrial revolution].");
Paul Ohm & Scott Peppet, What ifEverything Reveals Everything?, in BIG DATA IS NOT A
MONOLITH, supranote 7, at 45, 46 ("Particularly with the rise of cheap, distributed, networked
sensors-fueling the so-called Internet of Things-data sets about inanimate objects will bear
the ghostly traces of the human beings who passed by or interacted with those sensors. . . .");
Peppet,supranote 12, at 89 n.14 (attributing the phrase "Internet of Everything" to Cisco CEO
John Chambers).
16. Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 13. As the European Commission
explained.
Machine-generated data is created without the direct intervention of a human by
computer processes, applications or services, or by sensors processing information
received from equipment, software or machinery, whether virtual or real.
Machine-generated data can be personal or non-personal in nature. Where machinegenerated data allows the identification of a natural person, it qualifies as personal
data with the consequence that all the rules on personal data apply until such data
has been fully anonymised (e.g. location data of mobile applications).
Id at 9.
17. See Hugenholtz, supranote 6, at 48 (noting that the "calls for the introduction of a
novel property right in data" were in response "to demands of the automotive industry ... and
encouraged by a fair number of German lawyers and scholars" (footnote omitted)); see also
Josef Drexl, DesigningCompetitiveMarketsforIndustrialData-BetweenPropertisationand
Access, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 257, 259 (2017) (noting the
positions of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (German Industry Association) and
the Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft (Bavarian Industry Association)).
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personal data."'" As the Commission explained in its Communication
on "Buildinga Eumpean Data Economy ":
This approach would aim at clarifying the legal situation and giving more
choice to the data producer, by opening up the possibility for users to
utilise their data and thereby contribute to unlocking machine-generated
data. However, the relevant exceptions would need to be clearly
specified, in particular the provision of non-exclusive access to the data
by the manufacturer or by public authorities, for example for traffic
management or environmental reasons. Where personal data are
concerned, the individual will retain [the] right to withdraw his [or her]
consent at any time after authorising the use. Personal data would need
to be rendered anonymous in such a manner that the individual is not or
no longer identifiable, before its further use may be authorised by the
other party.19

In the run-up to this proposal and following the release of the
European Commission's communication document, commentators and
consumer advocates have heavily criticized the Commission's effort to
create new sui generisprotection for machine-generated data.20 One of
the most vociferous critics is Professor Bernt Hugenholtz of the
University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands.2 1 As he warned in a
timely analysis:
[I]ntroducing ...

an all-encompassing property right in data would

seriously compromise the system of intellectual property law that
currently exists in Europe. It would also contravene fundamental
freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and
the EU Charter [of Fundamental Rights], distort freedom of competition
and freedom of services in the EU, restrict scientific freedoms and
generally undercut the promise of big data for European economy and
society.22
Thus far, the discussion on the proposed data producer's right has
been limited to the European Union. Nevertheless, the United States
has actively explored policies in response to changes in the data-driven
economy and the growing significance of machine-generated data. The

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 13.
Id
For these critiques, see generally Drexl, supra note 17; Hugenholtz, supra note 6.
Hugenholtz, supra note 6.
Id at 50.
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Obama Administration, for -instance, released multiple reports
highlighting the complex policy questions in this economy.23
Moreover, intellectual property developments in the European
Union frequently travel across the Atlantic to affect legislative and
policy debates in the United States. While Congress has thus far
declined to follow the European Union's lead in adopting sui generis
database protection, 2 4 it created panty between the EU and U.S.
copyright terms by extending their duration for twenty years. 25
Following the October 1995 adoption of the Directive on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data,26 which is commonly referred to as
the Data Protection Directive, the United States also developed a "safe
harbor" privacy framework.27 That framework lasted for more than a
decade until the Court of Justice of the European Union rejected it as
noncompliant with the Directive in October 2015.28
Given the potential for the current EU proposal for a new data
producer's right to eventually emerge on U.S. soil, this Article takes a
23. For government reports analyzing the impacts and policy implications of big data
analytics and data-driven innovation, see generally EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG
DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORTHIMIC SYSTEMs, OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2016); EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supranote 10; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITES, PRESERVING VALUES: INTERIM PROGREss REPORT (2015) [hereinafter ExEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT]; FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A
TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUEs (2016); PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL OF ADVisoRS ON SC. & TECH., EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND
PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECHVE (2014).

24. See discussion infra Part IA.
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012) (providing extended terms of copyright protection in
the United States); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) ("[A] key factor in
the [passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act] was a 1993 [EU] directive
instructing EU members to establish a copyright term of life plus 70 years.").
26. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). See generally Symposium,
Data Protection Law and the European Union's Directive: The Challengefor the United
States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1995) (providing an excellent collection of articles on the Data
Protection Directive). Since May 25, 2018, this Directive has been replaced by the Regulation
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC. Council Regulation
2016/679,2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
27. See Peter K. Yu, Toward a Noneuro-Swn Approach to Resolving Global
IntellectualPropertyDisputes: What We Can Learnfrom Mediators, BusinessStrategists, and
InternationalRelations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 569, 630-34 (2002) (discussing the EUU.S. negotiation over the development of this fiamework).
28. See Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot Comm'r, 2015 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 650 (Oct. 6, 2015) (Grand Chamber) (invalidating the Commission Decision
2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 that found adequate the protection afforded by the safe harbor
privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce).
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preemptive approach of critically examining the proposal before it
begins to gain traction on this side of the Atlantic. Specifically, the
Article shows that the proposal has failed to learn from valuable lessons
from the past, does not meet the present needs of the U.S. data-driven
economy, and would likely raise considerable complications with the
future development of a sound and holistic data governance regime.
This Article further offers suggestions on how policy makers and
commentators should develop laws and policies regarding the
protection of machine-generated data.
Part II of this Article revisits the past developments concerning
sui generis database protection.2 9 Arguing that these developments
have provided instructive lessons on the potential adverse impacts of
the proposed data producer's right, this Part revisits the critiques of
sui generis database protection in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Building on the European Commission's inaugural evaluation 0 of
the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases" (EU Database
Directive), this Part shows that sui generisdatabase protection has thus
far not provided significant benefits to EU database industries.
Because that Directive has remained on the books despite not
generating its intended benefits, this Article utilizes the past two
decades of developments surrounding the Directive to warn about the
danger of introducing hastily adopted legislation without suflicient
evidence of proven needs and future success.
Part HI explores whether the present technological, business,
scientific, and personal needs in the United States could lend support
to the proposal for a new data producer's right When the EU Database
Directive and the U.S. sui generis database protection bills were
considered in the mid- to late 1990s, the Internet had only begun to
enter the mainstream. Recent years, however, have seen a dramatic
transformation of the digital environment, raising new legal and policy
questions concerning cloud computing, big data analytics, the Internet
of Things, machine learning, and artificial intelligence.3 2 This Part
shows that, although data have become increasingly important and
29. This Part includes materials that have been updated and expanded upon from the
Author's earlier discussion. See Peter Y, Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84
CH.-KENT L. REV. 777, 780-82, 789-801 (2010).
30.
COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMs., FIRSTEVALUATIONOFDIRECHVE 96/9/EC ON
THE LEGAL PROTECnON OF DATABASEs (2005).
31. Council Directive 96/9, 1996 OJ. (L 77) 20 (EC).
32. See Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Pamzdigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL L.
REv. 111, 121 (listing the various technological advances).
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valuable, the proposal for a new data producer's right does not meet
present technological needs. Worse still, that proposal is inconsistent
with the needs of our business and scientific communities. It may even
cause harm to individuals and society at large.
Part IV focuses on the potential complications regarding the
future development of a sound and holistic data governance regime.
This Part breaks these complications down into two subgroups:
endogenous complications and exogenous complications. Within the
area of machine-generated data, the proposal for a new data producer's
right would raise more questions than answers. Even if this right were
to generate incentives for producing these data, developing new laws
to protect such data would be complicated, difficult, and, on balance,
counterproductive. Outside the area of machine-generated data,
complications would also arise when the protection of the proposed
data producer's right spills over into other areas of the law, including
those within and outside the intellectual property system. Among the
various areas impacted by the proposed right, this Part explores those
concerning privacy, trade, and investment-all areas in which rights in
machine-generated data could emerge. The intersection with these
areas has attracted considerable attention in the intellectual property
law and policy debate.
Part V concludes this Article by suggesting four courses of action
that would help develop a sound and holistic data governance regime.
Although the Article's earlier analyses of the past, the present, and the
future caution against the proposal for creating a new data producer's
right, this Part goes further to advance three additional suggestions
beyond the outright rejection of the proposal. These suggestions focus
on conceptual rethinking, international norm setting, and academic and
policy engagement.
II.

PAST LESSONS

When the European Commission introduced the proposal for a
new data producer's right in October 2017," that proposal immediately
recalled the two decades of developments surrounding sui generis
database protection in the European Union. Adopted in March 1996,
the EU Database Directive required the then fifteen (now twenty-eight)
member states to offer sui generia protection to databases that are
33.

See Commission Commnication, supra note 2, at 13 (advancing the proposal for

the creation of a new data producer's right for nonpersonal, anonymized machine-generated
data).
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created as a result of "a substantial investment in either the obtaining,
verification or presentation of [database] contents." 34 Such protection
aimed to prevent the unauthorized "extraction and/or re-utilization of
the whole or of a substantial part" of these contents. 5
The initial term of protection is slightly over fifteen years,
"expir[ing] fifteen years from the first of January of the year following
the date of completion [of the making of the database]."' Upon the
demonstration of a "substantial change ... to the contents of a database,
including any substantial change resulting from the accumulation of
successive additions, deletions or alterations," the updated contents
will constitute a new database, thereby receiving protection for at least
another fifteen years." Such protection could be further extended as
long as the database contents are continuously updated in a manner
that would meet the "substantial new investment" threshold.39
While the proposal for the EU Database Directive garnered
considerable support in the European Union in the early 1990s, leading
to the Directive's eventual adoption in March 1996,4 similar proposals
failed on U.S. soil.4 1 Despite the introduction of multiple legislative
bills to provide similar protection from the mid-1990s to the early

Council Directive 96/9, supra note 31, art. 7(1).
Id
Id art. 10(1).
Id art. 10(3).
As Justin Hughes observed:
One of the most disturbing things about the EU Database Directive is that the
rights never seem to expire: nothing ever need enter the public domain. As long as
the database producer invests in refreshing, updating, or even re-verifying the
database, a new term of protection is generated over the entire database.
Justin Hughes, How Extra-CopyrightProtectionof DatabasesCan Be Constitutional, 28 U.
DAYTONL. REV. 159,211 (2003); see also REICHMANETAL., supra note 8, at 339 (noting that,
with the arrival of sui generis database protection, "[p]erpetual protection ... becomes an
attainable goal for the first time in the history of intellectual property laws (disregarding, of
course, trademark laws, which operate on fundamentally different principles)").
39.
Council Directive 96/9, supranote 31, art. 10(3).
40. See Mark Davison, Database Protection:Lessons from Europe, Congress, and
WIPO, 57 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 829, 844 (2007) ("[TJhe [European Community] started with
a relatively minimalist model for protection and ended with a new exclusive property right that,
until the [European Court of Justice's] decisions, appeared to confer considerable protection
on database owners. The process by which the version that was adopted by the European
Parliament in 1993 was transforned into the version that was finally adopted by the Council is
somewhat opaque.").
41. See Yu, supranote 29, at 780 (noting the failure of the legislative bills to introduce
suigenerisdatabase protection in the late 1990s and that the United States has yet to offer such
protection).
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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2000s, Congress declined to follow suit As Charles McManis
recounted:
Within ten weeks of the promulgation of the EU Database
Directive, the first legislation aimed at creating a sui generis right in the
United States, H.R. 3531, was proposed in the House of Representatives.
H.R. 3531 would have created a very strong property right with a twentyfive year term and potentially severe criminal sanctions for infringement
Opposition was unexpectedly intense and the bill never reached the floor.
HR. 3531's sequel, H.R. 2652, responded to concerns from the research
and library communities by including limited fair use provisions. This
bill was passed by the House as part ofthe Digital Millennium Copyright
Act [(DMCA)] on August 4, 1998; however, it was subsequently stricken
during negotiations with the Senate, and the DMCA passed shortly
thereafter on October 28, 1998.
The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, as
introduced on January 19, 1999, would accord a database developer a
broad right in factual compilations, subject not only to a specific
limitation for certain non-profit educational, scientific and research uses,
but also to a broader limitation for "reasonable uses" generally. The
reasonableness of a particular use is to be evaluated by a multi-factor test
that is somewhat reminiscent of the fair use privilege contained in section
107 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976. Notwithstanding the
inclusion of this broadened fair use provision, opponents of H.R. 354
introduced an alternative bill on May 19, 1999, the Consumer and
Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, that based liability on a
theory more analogous to the common law tort of "hot news"
misappropriation.42
Failing to obtain the much-needed support in Congress, the
Clinton Administration took its proposal abroad to an international
intergovernmental forum. Under the leadership of Bruce Lehman, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office collaborated with the European
Commission to push for a new Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Databases (Database Treaty) that was to be created under
the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).43
If adopted, this treaty would provide sui generis protection for at least

42. Charles R. McManis, Database Protection in the Digital Information Age, 7
ROGERWILuAMS U. L. REv. 7,35-36 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
43. For discussions of the draft Database Treaty proposal the United States submitted
to WIPO, see generally J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualPropertyRights in
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 102-10 (1997); Pamela Samuelson, The US. DigitalAgenda at
WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369,422-23 (1997).
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fifteen years and up to twenty-five years." The latter option, which
was provided as Alternative A," would provide ten more years of
protection than what the EU Database Directive currently provides."
Tracking this Directive, the proposed treaty would offer new protection
to any database that was modified in a manner that would result in a
"substantial change to the database, . . . including any substantial
change resulting from the accumulation of successive additions,
deletions, verifications, modifications in organization or presentation,
or other alterations."'
Despite this trans-Atlantic collaboration, the treaty failed to move
beyond the proposal stage." The lack of success was largely attributed
to the problems posed by sui generis database protection and the
continued divide between the European Union and the United States.
Particularly notable was the opposition of the U.S. research and library
communities, which managed to secure allied support from noted U.S.
academics.4 9 The timing of the treaty negotiation was also less than
See World Intellectual Property Org. [WIPO], Basic Prposalfor the Substantive
44.
Provisionsofthe Treaty on IntellectualPropertyin Respect ofDatabasesto Be Consideredby
the Dolomatic Conference, at 31, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30,1996) (providing the
draft text for art. 8(1)).
See id at 30 ("The 25-year and 15-year alternatives are found in D g a (1) and
45.
of Article 8. The decision on the term of protection has been left to the
(2)
ra
Diplomatic Conference.").
See Council Directive 96/9, supranote 31, art. 10 (providing sui generisdatabase
46.
protection for at least fifteen years).
WIPO, supra note 44, at 31.
47.
48.
As Pamela Samuelson recounted.
Widespread criticism of the Chairman's draft database treaty caused its quick
removal from the conference agenda. Consideration of the draft database treaty has,
however, not merely been postponed or sent back to the Committee of Experts for
further refinement; it has been taken off the table. In order for database protection
issues to be raised again at WIPO, the governing body of WIPO will have to
constitute a new Committee of Experts to study the matter.
Samuelson, supm note 43, at 426 (footnote omitted); see also Jonathan Band & Brandon
Butler, Overlapping Forms of Protectionfor Databases, in OVERIAPPING INTELLECHUAL
PRoPERTY RIGHTs 189, 206 (Neil Wilkof & Shanad Basheer eds., 2012) ('In the face of the
opposition from the developing countries and the United States, the WIPO goveming body
decided at the outset of the Diplomatic Conference to defer further consideration of the
database treaty.").
49. As Jonathan Band and Brandon Butler recounted:
[The scientific community in the United States reacted with alarm to the proposed
[Database Treaty], arguing that it would stifle research. The science agencies within
the US government (eg, the Environmental Protection Agency and the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration) took the lead in persuading the
National Economic Council within the White House to oppose adoption of a
database treaty.
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ideal: the Database Treaty proposal was cramped into an already
crowded negotiation agenda that included two important Internet
treatiess---the WIPO Copyright Treaty" and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty.52
Had Commissioner Lehman and his staff managed to get the
proposed Database Treaty adopted at WIPO, they would have achieved
what commentators have referred to as "policy laundering""--the
"efforts [undertaken] by policy actors to have policy initiatives seen as
exogenously determined, or even seen as requirements imposed by
powerful others." By negotiating an international agreement to cover
protection that did not receive sufficient domestic legislative support,
the Clinton Administration sought to launder an unpopular and illadvised policy through the international negotiation process. In doing
so, the Administration hoped that the policy would become more
legitimate when it returned to the home soil for deliberation.55 Such a
laundering effort aimed to make an end run around Congress and the
domestic deliberative process."
Subpart A begins with sui generis database protection because
such protection has attracted similar criticisms as the proposal for a new
data producer's right Putting the debate on data protection in a
Thus, Commissioner Lehman arrived in Geneva in early December 1996 with
instructions to stop the very database treaty that he had helped set in motion.
Band & Butler, supranote 48, at 206; see also Samuelson, supranote 43, at 423-25 (discussing
the expressions of concern and opposition to the draft Database Treaty from various quarters).
50.
See generally Samuelson, supra note 43 (discussing the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic
Conference in Geneva and the formation of the WIPO Internet Treaties).
51.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,2186 U.N.T.S. 121.
52.
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
53.
For discussions of "policy laundering," see generally David Banisar, Stopping
Science: The Case of Cryptography,9 HEALTH MAnTUX 253, 282-86 (1999); Ian Hosein, The
Sources of Laws: Policy Dynamics in a Digitaland Terrorized World 20 INFo. Soc'Y 187,
188-89 (2004); Yu, supra note 29, at 787-88.
54. Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and
Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Paceedings,24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 121,
128 (2006).
55.
See Hosein, supm note 53, at 188 (noting the general notion that "international
cooperation is inherently good" and the general belief that international cooperation is "seen
as benign and ... for the most part uninterrogated").
56.
As Samuelson reminded us:
Had [ithe development of the Database Treaty] succeeded in Geneva, Clinton
administration officials would almost certainly have then argued to Congress that
ratification of the treaties was necessary to confirm U.S. leadership in the world
intellectual property community and to promote the interests of U.S. copyright
industries in the world market for information products and services.
Samuelson, supra note 43, at 374.
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historical perspective, this subpart revisits the U.S. legislative debate
concerning sui generis database protection in the late 1990s and early
2000s. While it is helpful to recount the different reasons why
Congress rejected such protection, this historic debate also provides
instructive lessons on the potential adverse impacts of the proposed
data producer's right. To a large extent, the arguments against
introducing sui generis database protection in the United States two
decades ago will militate against the present proposal for a new data
producer's right.
Because Congress declined to introduce sui generis database
protection in the late 1990s and early 2000s, we will never know what
would have happened had such protection been introduced in the first
place. Nevertheless, counterfactual reasoning can be deployed to shed
light on this potential scenario.? Even better, the past two decades of
developments surrounding the EU Database Directive have provided a
comparable experience to support a counterfactual narrative. To
document these developments, subpart B recapitulates the widely
criticized evaluation the European Commission undertook shortly
before the Directive's tenth anniversary." Given that the Commission
recommended the retention of the Directive despite a highly negative
evaluation, the discussion in this subpart further illustrates the problems
that would have surfaced had sui generis database protection been
adopted in the United States. The identified problems also provide an
important warning of the danger of hastily adopting legislation without
sufficient evidence of proven needs and future success.

57. As Robert Cowley noted in his introduction to What lf?: "What ifs can lead us to
question long-head assumptions. What ifs can define true turning points. They can show that
small accidents or split-second decisions are as likely to have major repercussions as large ones
.... They can [even] eliminate what has been called 'hindsight bias."' Robert Cowley,
Introduction to WHAT IF?: THE WoRLD's FOREMOST MILITARY HISTORIANS IMAGINE WHAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN, at xi-xii (Robert Cowley ed., 1999); see also ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE
POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 210-20 (2005) (using

counterfactual reasoning to explain why other arguments are less persuasive than those
presented in his book); James D. Fearon, CounterfactualsandHypothesis Testing in Political

Science, 43 WORLD POL. 169, 194 (1991) ("Counterfactuals and the counterfactual strategy of
hypothesis testing play an important but often unacknowledged and underdeveloped role in the
efforts of political scientists to assess causal hypotheses."); Peter K. Yu, What Ifs and Other
AlternativeIntellectualPropertyand Cyberlaw Stories: Foreword,2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (discussing the use of counterfactual reasoning). See generally DAVID K. LEWIS,
COUNIERFACTUALS (1973) (providing an overview of counterfactual reasoning).
58. CouMN oF TBE EUROPEAN COMMS., supra note 30.
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HistoricalInsights

Following the adoption of the EU Database Directive in March
1996, Congress considered a number ofsui generisdatabase protection
bills. The first bill-the Database Investment and Intellectual Property
Antipiracy Act of 1996"-was introduced less than three months after
the Directive's adoption.' Since then, Congress has considered several
legislative bius-most notably the Collections of Information
Antipiracy Act of 1998,61 the Collections of Information Antipiracy
Act of 1999,62 and the Consumer and Investor Access to Information
Act of 1999.63 Up until the early 2000s, the U.S. policy makers and
legislators remained interested in introducing sui generis database
protection. With the passage of time, however, such efforts slowly
faded away.6
As the proponents of these legislative bills argued, sui generis
protection would provide to U.S. database industries the much-needed
incentives to collect data. Such protection was particularly attractive
following the United States Supreme Court's decision to drastically
reduce copyright protection for databases in FeistPublications,Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co."5 Decided in March 1991, the Court held
59. H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
60.
McManis, supra note 42, at 35; see also Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to
ProfessorBenkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 605, 615 (2000) ("In May 1996, the first database
protection bill in the United States was introduced in Congress.").
61.
H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998). Upon adoption by the House of Representatives,
this bill became part V of the DMCA until it was dropped from the largerH.R. 2281 bill. As
Jerome Reichman and Paul Uhlir recounted.
The House of Representatives adopted H.R. 2652, and the Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property then attached it to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
which became H.R. 2281, as sent to the Senate. The database portion was dropped
prior to Congressional enactment of that bill, however, and it was reintroduced with
some modifications as H.R. 354 in January 1999.
J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, DatabaseProtectionat the Crossroads:Recent Developments
and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 802-03 (1999)
(footnote omitted).
62.
H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).
63.
H.R 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
64. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection ofDatabases,82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109,
1139-40 n.172 (2007) (recalling a House report tracking the various sui generis database
protection bills and providing useful sources on the different bills).
65.
499 U.S. 340 (1991). As Band and Butler recounted:
Database publishers argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Feist significantly
diminished publishers' incentive to invest in the compilation of information. They
argued that post-Feist, copyright was particularly ineffective with respect to large
comprehensive online databases that are used by means of a search engine. The
compiler has exercised no selection because the databases are comprehensive.
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that the white pages of a telephone directory did not constitute a
sufficiently original work of authorship that qualified for copyright
protection. " As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor clearly stated, a
compilation did not warrant copyright protection unless the collected
information was selected, coordinated, or arranged in an original
manner.6 7

Moreover, the EU Database Directive specifically includes a
reciprocity provision that excludes protection from foreign database
producers whose country of origin does not offer comparable
protection.6 8 Thus, if U.S. database industries were to compete effectively
against their EU counterparts, the United States would have to offer
parity protection." Without such protection, investment for database

Further, arrangement only occurs when the user conducts a search. In the absence
of selection and arrangement, copyright protection is not available.
Band & Butler, supranote 48, at 201. Justin Hughes, however, questioned the impact ofFeist
on the U.S. database industry:
In North America, there is no evidence that database production has
weakened in the post-Feistenvironment and, in fact, one of the major proponents of
database protection announced plans in 2000 to sell $2.5 billion worth of copyrightprotected newspapers and put a substantial chunk of those proceeds into "expanding
its electronic databases" in a program to make 80% of its revenue "come from the
electronic distribution of information" within five years. That does not sound like a
business environment inhospitable to investment in databases.
Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professorsand the FormationofLegal
Norms, 35 Loy. U. C. L.J. 155, 201 (2003) (footnote omitted) (quoting Timothy Pritchard,
MEDI; Thomson Jmps HeadFirstinto an ElectronicFuture, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/21/business/media-thomson-jumps-head-first-into-anelectronic-future.html); see also Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database
Protectionat the Junctureof the Commerce Clause, the IntellectualProperty Clause, andthe
FirstAmendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. LJ. 47, 90-97 (1999) (discussing the economics
of database production and explaining why databases are not in danger).
66. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 364 ("Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality,
Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement").
67. See id at 358 ("[W]e conclude that the [1976 Copyright Act] envisions that there
will be some fact-based works in which the selection, coordination, and arrangement are not
sufficiently original to trigger copyright protection.").
68. See Council Directive 96/9, supra note 31, art. 11(3) ("Agreements extending the
right provided for in Article 7 to databases made in third countries and falling outside the
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be concluded by the Council acting on a proposal from
the Commission. The term of any protection extended to databases by virtue of that procedure
shall not exceed that available pursuant to Article 10."); see also Reichman & Samuelson,
supra note 43, at 96-97 (discussing the European Commission's "strict criterion of material
reciprocity"); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the InternationalIntellectual
PropertyRegime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 379 (2004) (discussing the reciprocal provisions
in the EU Database Directive).
69.
As Band and Butler recounted-
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production would slowly migrate from the United States to Europe."o
Policy makers and industries also feared that "databases produced by
U.S. companies [would] become vulnerable to foreign competition and
piracy in European markets." In short, EU database producers would
become more successful than those in the United States.
Notwithstanding these arguments and the related lobbying effort,
Congress declined to introduce sui generis database protection for five
reasons. First, such protection did not fit well with the U.S. copyright
regime. As noted earlier, the Feist Court declined to grant copyright
protection to nonoriginal, noncreative databases.72 Because of this
seminal decision, and the fact that few commentators had considered
the case wrongly decided, the proponents of sui generis database
protection bills were fighting an uphill battle." After all, any new
The proponents ... argued that adoption of the Database Directive necessitated
enactments of database legislation in the United States. The Database Directive's
suigenerisprotection is available only on a reciprocity basis. This meant that a nonEU publisher can receive the heighted level of protection only if the publisher's
country of origin afforded an equivalent level of protection. In other words, if the
US did not enact database legislation on par with the Database Directive, then US
publishers could not receive this added protection in Europe. European publishers,
in contrast, would receive the protection against US publishers, thereby placing US
publishers at a competitive disadvantage.
Band & Butler, supra note 48, at 201; see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCiL, A QUESTION OF
BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL

52 (1999) (noting the "perceived increased vulnerability of databases to .. . a new
European legal regime that has been alleged to place U.S. database rights holders at a
competitive disadvantage in Europe").
70. As I noted in an earlier article:
In light of the very different protection offered in these countries, businesses
have engaged in regulatory arbitrage by relocating their operations to jurisdictions
that offer more favorable legal environments. To attract foreign investment and to
retain local businesses, countries now actively participate in a "race" to either the
top or the bottom.
Yu, supra note 29, at 779 (footnote omitted). For discussions of regulatory arbitrage, see
generally Dan L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE:
INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 205, 219-21 (Brian
Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of
Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLiCY AND THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTuRE, supra, at 129, 142-54; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
PropertyArbitrage:How ForeignRules Can Affect Domestic Protections,71 U. CHI. L. REV.
223,225-26 (2004).
71.
Yu, supm note 27, at 623; see also Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 96
('Databases made in countries having no similar legislation would remain vulnerable to
wholesale copying within the European Union itself.
72. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
73. See Yu, supranote 29, at 780-81 ('The cold reception of database protection can
be largely attributed to the 1991 case of Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
DATABASES
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protection created through these bills would result in conflicts with the
then-existing copyright regime, which denied protection to databases
that do not involve selection, coordination, or arrangement of
information in an original manner.
Second, questions arose over the constitutionality of granting
property rights in nonoriginal, noncreative databases. By offering
protection under the "sweat of the brow" doctrine expressly rejected by
the Feist Court, the proposed protection would unlikely pass muster
under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution."4 The Feist Court not
only rejected the protection for the white pages of a telephone directory
but also explicitly stated that "[o]riginality is a constitutional
requirement."s Apart from issues relating to the Copyright Clause,"
many commentators also subscribed to the view that the bills would
raise serious constitutional questions under both the Commerce
Clausen and the First Amendment.78
Co., a key United States Supreme Court decision that disqualified the white pages of a
telephone directory for copyright protection." (footnote omitted)).
74. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 352-54 (rejecting the "sweat of the brow" doctrine). The
"sweat of the brow" doctrine is "the underlying notion ... that copyright was a reward for the
hard work that went into compiling facts." Id at 352; see also Yu, supranote 27, at 623 n.355
("Sweat of the brow' theory is the notion that industrious collection of facts is rewarded with
copyright protection.").
Feist,499 U.S. at 346; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (requiring originality for
75.
copyright protection). For discussions of Feist and the constitutional originality requirement,
see generally Dennis S. Kaijala, CopyrightandMisappropriation,17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885
(1992); Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact ofFeist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 331 (1992); Russ
VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality,34 WM. & MARYL. REv. 801 (1993); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks
in the Tinderbox: Feist "Creativity, "and the Legislative History of the 1976 CopyrightAct,
56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 549 (1995).
76. See Hamilton, supra note 60, at 619-21 (discussing the constitutional deficiencies
of U.S. database legislation in relation to the Copyright Clause); Pollack, supra note 65, at 5054 (discussing the constitutional constraints on database protection imposed by the Copyright
Clause).
77. See Hamilton, supra note 60, at 621-25 (discussing the constitutional deficiencies
of U.S. database legislation in relation to the Commerce Clause); Hughes, supra note 38, at
170-89 (discussing how extra-copyright protection of databases at the federal level must
navigate the tension between Congress's broad power to control interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause and its limited power to establish federal intellectual property rights under
the Copyright Clause); Pollack, supra note 65, at 55-66 (discussing the constitutional
constraints on database protection imposed by the Commerce Clause).
78. See Hamilton, supranote 60, at 615-28 (discussing the constitutional deficiencies
of U.S. database legislation in relation to the First Amendment); Pollack, supra note 65, at 6774 (discussing the constitutional constraints on database protection imposed by the First
Amendment). But see James Weinstein, DatabaseProtectionandthe FirstAmendment, 28 U.
DAYTONL. REv. 305 (2003) (offering a framework for analyzing the compatibility of database
protection with the First Amendment); see also Hughes, supranote 38, at 189-202 (responding
to First Amendment critiques of sui generis database protection).
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Third, many policy makers and commentators considered sui
generis database protection to be bad public policy whose costs would
likely outweigh its benefits. For example, the protection "would confer
far broader and stronger exclusive rights on database content than is
necessary to provide the needed incentives for database producers.""
By granting a monopoly over collected data, such protection would
also allow private actors to lock up information that was essential to
basic scientific research and future creative endeavors." The protection
would even establish an anticompetitive environment that would make
it difficult for value-adding products and services to enter the market.'
Such an environment, in turn, would make information products more
expensive, thereby harming consumers and society at large.
Fourth, sui generis database protection was considered
unnecessary because database producers already enjoyed significant
83
protection under private contracts, 82 the misappropriation doctrine,
and state unfair competition laws." These producers could also protect
their valuable data by deploying technological protection measures.85

&

79. Peter K. Yu, Bridging the DigitalDivide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOzo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 46 (2002).
80. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 113-24 (discussing the adverse
impact of sui generis database protection on scientific research and education); Reichman
Uhlir, supra note 61, at 796-821 (discussing the adverse impact of database protection laws on
scientific, technical, and educational users of factual data and information).
8 1. See Yochai Benkler, ConstitutionalBounds of DatabaseProtection: The Role of
JudicialReview in the CreationandDeftinitionofPrivateRights in Information, 15 BERKELEY
TECa L.J. 535, 562-65 (2000) (discussing the anticompetitive nature of database protection
laws); Reichman & Samuelson, supranote 43, at 124-30 (discussing how sui generis database
protection would impede competition in the market for value-adding products and services).
82. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databasesin the UnitedStates andAbroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151, 151 (1997) ("If copyright
is unavailing, contract is appearing more promising, as mass-market, 'shrinkwrap' and 'clickon' licenses gain acceptance. Indeed, if contractual protection of compiled information persists
unpreempted by federal copyright law or policy, it may provide more effective protection than
did copyright." (footnote omitted)); Marshall Leaffer, DatabaseProtectionin the UnitedStates
Is Alive and Well: Comments on Davison, 57 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 855, 858-59 (2007)
(discussing the alternative form of protection provided by state law remedies, in particular
contract law remedies).
83. See Ginsburg, supranote 82, at 157-64 (discussing the protection provided by the
common law doctrine of misappropriation to databases).
84. See W.R. Cornish, 1996EuropeanCommunity Directive on DatabaseProtection,
21 CouiM.-VLA JL. & ARiTs 1, 3 (1996) (discussing the law of unfair competition as a mode
of protection for databases); Reichman & Samuelson, supranote 43, at 139-45 (discussing the
use of unfair competition principles to protect database contents).
85. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 69, at 64-68 (discussing the availability
of technological protections, including encryption, watermarks, online access controls, and
tusted systems); Band & Butler, supra note 48, at 200 ('The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act provides additional protection to the publishers of electronic databases. For databases
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Although Congress had yet to offer anti-circumvention protection
through the DMCA" when sui generis database protection bills began
to emerge in the mid-1990s, technological measures had been used to
protect computer software and digital content for decades before the
statute's adoption."8
Finally, the proposed database protection legislation did not get
sufficient traction on Capitol Hill." Out of the three major stakeholders
in the global database industry, only McGraw-Hill was American." To
be sure, the United States emulated the European Union when the latter
extended the term of copyright protection from the life of the author
plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years."
Nevertheless, those in the United States who would have benefited
from sui generis database protection did not compare favorably with
distributed in digital form, technological measures that prevent unauthorized access,
reproduction, and distribution are becoming more prevalent and powerful."); Drexl, supra note
17, at 291 ("Data holders are able to charge a price for making data available to third parties
based on factual control over data, supported by technical protection measures."); Leaffer,
supra note 82, at 859 ("[Tihe anticircumvention provisions of the [DMCA] create substantial
protection, particularly for electronic databases." (footnote omitted)); Pollack, supra note 65,
at 99-111 (discussing the alternative protection provided by technological protection measures
and the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA).
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012) (providing anti-circumvention protection).
86.
87. See Peter IC Yu, Anticircrnvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L.
REv. 13, 14 (2006) ("Digital rights management... systems, including technological measures
that are used to protect copyrighted works, are not new. They have existed for at least the last
couple of decades." (footnote omitted)).
As I noted in an earlier article:
88.
Instead of providing substantial facts on the harm that the lack of Congressional
responses would cause to the U.S. database industry, the sponsors and proponents of
this legislation were able to make only generalized claims of potential foreign
competition and piracy in European markets. Because many businesses were both
producers and users of data, they remained reluctant to support stronger database
protection until they were certain that the proposed legislation would strike the
appropriate balance between the production of databases and the use of collected
information.
Yu, supranote 29, at 782 (footnote omitted).
89. See Benkler, supra note 81, at 592 ("[The rallying cry 'protect our database
producers from the Europeans' rings hollow when testimony suggested that of the three major
industry stakeholders only one, McGraw Hill, is an American company, while another, ReedElsevier, is a European company. (The third was Thompson, a Canadian company.)"
(footnotes omitted)). Ironically, as the National Research Council observed in its report, "The
only significant economic analysis done in the United States with regard to the [sui generis
database protection] legislation was an article commissioned by [these two foreign
stakeholders]." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 93.
90. See Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC) (extending the term of
copyright protection); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 196 (2003) (noting that the
new term of life of the author plus seventy years "harmonizes the baseline United States
copyright term with the term adopted by the European Union in 1993").
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those who benefited from the copyright term extension. 1 Even so,
such extension had been so controversial that its constitutionality was
challenged before the Supreme Court in Eldredv. Ashcmoft.
Taken together, these five reasons explain why the United
States-or, for that matter, many other non-EU countries 93 -have thus
far declined to introduce sui generis database protection. More
importantly, those arguments that helped defeat database protection
bills two decades ago could apply to any proposal for a new data
producer's right. Thus, if such a proposal is to emerge in the United
States, policy makers should actively draw on prior lessons regarding
sui generis database protection to highlight the proposal's weaknesses
and the challenges and potential constitutional questions it will bring
about.
B.

CounterfactualInsights

Although the past experiences concerning the introduction of sui
generis database protection in the United States are highly instructive,
it will also be useful to look at what would have happened had such
protection been put in place on U.S. soil. Because Congress declined
to introduce sui generis database protection in the late 1990s and early
2000s, counterfactual reasoning will be needed to imagine the scenario
where the United States has introduced such protection. Fortunately,
the EU Database Directive was adopted in March 1996 and has since
been implemented by all twenty-eight EU members.' Once crossAtlantic differences have been taken into account, the past experience
with the Directive provides useful insights into whether the United
91. See Hugh Hansen et al., Panell:DatabaseProtection,11 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MIEDIA & ENr. L.J. 275,299 (2001) ("[Wjhereas the copyright term affected a lot more people,
database is more discrete. I think you also have a user community that is much more active
with regard to database protection than there was with regard to the Term Directive." (remarks
of Hugh Hansen, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law)).
92. 537 U.S. 186.
93. See RECHMAN Er AL., supra note 8, at 325 (noting that database protection laws
are "now enacted in fifty-five countries"); Band & Butler, supranote 48, at 196 (listing Iceland,
Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey as some of the countries that have adopted some form of sui
generisdatabase protection).
94. As Band and Butler recounted:
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal delayed in their implementation of [the
EU Database Directive]. On 30 July 1999, the European Commission initiated legal
proceedings before the European Court of Justice against these four countries for
failure to implement the Directive by the implementation date. All 27 [now twentyeight] member states of the European Union have . .. adopted the directive.
Band & Butler, supranote 48, at 192.

880

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:859

States would have been better or worse off had the country introduced
sui generis database protection.
In February 2006, shortly before the tenth anniversary of the EU
Database Directive, the European Commission undertook a
comprehensive evaluation of the Directive." This inaugural report
specifically assessed whether the Directive's policy goals had been
achieved and whether the Directive had an adverse impact on
competition.96 The report's findings were both revealing and highly
disturbing.
As the report showed, the EU Database Directive failed to provide
much benefit to the European Union.97 Worse still, the Directive might
have harmed the EU publishing and database industries. In 2001, the
year after most of the first fifteen EU member states had transposed the
Directive into national law, there were 4085 EU database entries." By
contrast, in 2004, that number had quickly declined by close to a
quarter to 3095.99 Although the Directive aimed to create a level
playing field between the EU and U.S. database industries, "[b]etween
2002 and 2004, the European share decreased from 33% to 24% while
the US share increased from 62% to 72%. The ratio of European/US
database production, which was nearly 1:2 in 1996, has become 1:3 in
2004."'"0
Given the EU database producers' reduced competitiveness, one
would naturally expect the European Commission to recommend the
95. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMS., supra note 30; see also James Boyle,
Opinion, Janes Boyle: Two DatabaseCheersfor the EU, FIN. TnMEs (Jan. 2, 2006), https://
www.ftcom/content/99610a50-7bb2-1lda-ab8e-0000779e2340 (discussing the European
Commission's evaluation report).
96. See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMs., supranote 30, at 3 ("The purpose of this
evaluation is to assess whether the policy goals of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of
databases ... have been achieved and, in particular, whether the creation of a special 'sui
generis' right has had adverse effects on competition." (footnote omitted)).
97. See id at 5 ("The economic impact of the 'sui generis' right on database production
is unproven. Introduced to stimulate the production of databases in Europe, the new instrument
has had no proven impact on the production of databases.").
98. Id at 24.
99. Id Nevertheless, Matthias Leistner noted that the Commission's evaluation
completely ignore[d] the fact that in the first years after the enactment of the
Database Directive the European database industry had indeed increased
substantially and that the crucial decrease of database production from 2001 to 2004
might indeed rather be linked to the general crisis of the information industries in
that period or other incidental factors.
Matthias Leistner, The ProtectionofDatabases,in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF
EU COPYRIGHT 427,449 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009).
100. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMS., supra note 30, at 22.
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repeal, withdrawal, or at least amendment of the Directive.10 ' The
Commission, however, declined to make any of those
recommendations.
Instead, it advanced three justifications for
retaining this ineffective and highly problematic Directive.
First, the Commission "ha[d] received strong representations
from the European publishing industry that 'sui generis' protection
[was] crucial to the continued success of their activities."o2 As the
Commission explicitly acknowledged, "[T]he attachment to the new
right [was] a political reality that seem[ed] very true for Europe." 03
While the Commission's observation was undoubtedly supported by
the online surveys of stakeholders in the database industry, the survey
approach was methodologically flawed. As James Boyle lamented in
the Financial 77mes immediately after the report's release, the
Commission's "questionnaire to the European database industry asking
if they liked their intellectual property right [was comparable to] a
procedure with all the rigour of setting farm policy by asking French
farmers how they feel about agricultural subsidies.""
Second, a repeal of the EU Database Directive "would require
withdrawing, or 'reverse', legislation and that might reopen the original
05
debate on the appropriate standard of 'originality."'s

Similarly, a

reformulation of the scope of the sui generis database right would
"require the Community legislator to revisit the compromise
underlying the two-tier protection introduced by the Directive where a
distinction is made between 'original' databases that have to comply
with a high standard of 'originality' and 'non-original' databases that
enjoy a form of 'sui generis' protection."'" The Commission's position
is understandable, considering that a key achievement of the Directive
was to facilitate harmonization within the European Union."0o Before
101. See id at 24-27 (outlining the four options as (1) "[rlepeal the whole directive,"
(2) "[w]ithdraw the 'sui generis' right," (3) "[almend the 'sui generis' provisions," and
(4) "[m]aintain[] the status quo").
102. Id at 24.
103. Id at 25.
104. Boyle, supra note 95; see also Davison, supra note 40, at 843 ('Of course, one
should take with more than a grain of salt the suggestion from an industry that gets legal
protection that the continuation of the protection is critical for its survival.").
105. COMM'NOFTHEEUROPEANCOMMS., supranote 30, at 6.
106. Id
107. As the European Commission explained in its evaluation report:
The Directive attempts to establish a uniform threshold of "originality" for
"original" databases. This level of protection has the effect that the United Kingdom
and Ireland, which applied a lower threshold of "originality", were required to "lift
the bar" and accord copyright protection to only those databases which were
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the Directive's full implementation, some EU countries-most notably
Ireland and the United Kingdom 1s-offered copyright protection to
"'non-original' databases involving considerable skill, labour or
judgment in gathering together and/or checking a compilation."'"
Nordic countries also had a "catalogue rule," "0 which afforded
protection for a short duration to "[c]atalogues, tables, and similar
compilations in which a large number of particulars have been
summarized." 1 ' By contrast, after the implementation of the Directive,
nonoriginal databases receive only sui generisdatabase protection, not
copyright protection.
Third, "[r]emoving the 'sui generis' right and thereby allowing
Member States to revert to prior forms of legal protection for all forms
of 'non-original' databases that do not meet the threshold of
'originality', might be more costly than keeping it in place."" 2 As the
outcome of the European Commission's evaluation revealed, "laws can
be politically entrenched, and amending these laws can be difficult
even if they have proven to be ineffective or harmful.""' Thus, if

"original" in the sense of the author's own intellectual creation. As a result,
databases which qualified for copyright protection under the "sweat of the brow"
regime would no longer be protected. In exchange, and in order to compensate for
the loss of the "sweat of the brow" protection, the "sui generis" form of protection
for "non-original" databases was introduced as an entirely novel form of intellectual
property.
Id at 8; see also William F. Patry, A Few ObservationsAbout the State of Copyight Law, in
COPYRIGHT LAw IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND ExcEPTIoNs 85, 100 (Ruth L. Okediji ed.,

2017) (describing as "laudable" the Database Directive's "goal ... to harmonize the level of
originality required for a database to be protected under copyright laws"). But see Davison,
supra note 40, at 852 ("The lack of harmony is reflected in conflicting case law decisions and
different approaches to the adoption of defenses allowed under the Directive. While the
difficulties of conflicting case decisions may be partially resolved by the [European Court of
Justice] decisions, in the interim, there have been considerable differences in approach both
within and between individual European jurisdictions.").
108. See CouM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMs., supra note 30, at 8 (noting that "the
United Kingdom and Ireland. . . applied a lower threshold of 'originality").
109. Id at 7.
110. See id at 8 n.9 ("Denmark, Finland and Sweden protected 'a catalogue, a table or
another similar production in which a large number of information items have been compiled'
under the so-called 'catalogue rule'."). See generally Gunnar W.G. Karnell, The Nordic
Catalogue Rule, in PROTECrING WORKS OF FACr 67 (Egbert J. Dommering & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., 1991) (discussing the Nordic catalogue rule).
111. Kamell, supra note 110, at 67 (quoting 5 ch. 49 § LAG OM UPPHOVSRATT TIL
LITTERARA OCH KONSTNARULGA VERK (Svensk fbrfattningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (Swed.)).
112.

COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMS., supranote 30, at 27.

113. Yu, supranote 29, at 801; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and
Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998) (discussing the lock-in effects in law); Yu, supra note 87,
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policy makers are unsure about the potential benefits or effectiveness
of a new legislative proposal, such as the one to create a new data
producer's right, they should advance with great caution,114 demand
empirical evidence,"' and undertake impact assessment."'
In sum, the European Commission's evaluation of the EU
Database Directive provided an important warning about the danger of
hastily adopting legislation without sufficient evidence ofproven needs
and future success. While laws that fail to achieve the intended goals
or that ill fit the economic and technological environment should be
repealed or modified, such changes do not always take place even with
careful documentation of the laws' problems. Indeed, as then-Dean
(now Judge) Guido Calabresi rightly observed, the legal system has
been filled with a "retentionist bias" that allows outmoded laws to stay
on the books." 7
Thus, contrary to the claims advanced by the proponents of sui
generis database protection, the United States' failure to adopt such
protection has actually helped local database producers."' Mark
at 57-61 (discussing entrenched laws and their lock-in effects, with illustrations from the anticircumvention provision of the DMCA).
114. See Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 70 ("Introducing a novel right of intellectual
property should of course never be done in the spur of the moment.").
115. See WHLuAM PATRY, How To Fix CoPYRiGHT 52 (2011) (noting the need for
"mandatory, independently-produced, impartial, empirically rigorous impact statements before
any new copyright legislation is passed"); Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 70 ("Any new
[intellectual property] right should be contemplated only after conducting thorough economic,
evidence-based research that demonstrates a real need for the right and predicts its
consequences for information markets and society at large."); Peter K. Yu, DigitalCopyright
and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TAcl. L. 881, 918-22 (2011) (noting the need
for the proponents of intellectual property reform to provide credible empirical support).
116. Impact assessments are increasingly important in the intellectual property field. As
I noted in an earlier article:
In recent years, impact assessments have been widely endorsed in the areas
of human rights, public health, and biological diversity. Assessment, evaluation, and
impact studies also constitute one of the six clusters of recommendations adopted as
part of the WIPO Development Agenda in October 2007. To ensure more accurate
assessments, countries should deploy holistic impact assessments that involve
institutional cooperation across sectors and agencies. Preferably, these assessments
will be conducted before the introduction of new forms of protection. If such
assessments cannot be undertaken at that time-for example, as a result of heavy
external pressure from developed country government-assessments should still
be conducted following the introduction of new standards or measures, perhaps after
a specified period of time.
Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy and ViralSovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1563, 162526 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
117. See GUIDO CAiABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 60 (1982).
118. As I observed in an earlier article:
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Davison went even further to suggest that the country's refusal to
follow the European Union's lead has benefited the world at large:
If the U.S. domino had fallen, the world would today have far more
widespread database rights for non-original databases via either
multilateral or bilateral agreements. And then, after it was too late, the
world would have discovered what the [European Community] has now
discovered, namely, that there is no need for such a right"'
III. PRESENT NEEDS
When the debate about sui generis database protection emerged
in the early 1990s, the technological environment was very different
from what it is today. Indeed, the proposal for the EU Database
Directive drew on the catalogue rule found commonly in Nordic
countries.1 20 Although the Directive ended up covering both electronic
and nonelectronic databases,"' the catalogue rule, as its name suggests,
was designed primarily for the offline world, not the online world.'" It
After reading [the European Commission's inaugural report on the EU Database
Directive], many Americans may be thankful that Congress did not hastily adopt sui
generis database protection legislation in response to the .. . Directive. They may
also be grateful to those who worked hard to lobby against the adoption of the draft
WIPO Database Treaty, which, if adopted, would no doubt sneak back into the
country as laws made through the backdoor.
Yu, supra note 29, at 800-01.
119. Davison, supranote 40, at 852.
120. As Reichman and Samuelson recounted.
[T]he Nordic countries had already experimented with short-term, copyright-like
protection of noncopyrightable compilations-known as the Nordic "catalogue
rule"-with a view to curbing commercial piracy without extending full copyright
protection to borderline literary productions that lacked creative authorship.
Accordingly, in 1992, the Commission proposed an innovative directive to protect
such databases that was "loosely modelled on the Nordic catalogue rule, [and] more
directly and strongly protects electronic information tools." A greatly amended
version of this proposal was adopted by the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament in .uly 1995 which, with only modest, technical changes, took effect on
March 11, 1996.
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 74-75 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting J. Reichman, Legal Hybrds Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLJM. L. REv. 2432,2493 (1994)).
121. See Council Directive 96/9, supra note 31, recital 14 (noting that "protection under
this Directive should be extended to cover non-electronic databases"); see also CoMM'N OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMS., supra note 30, at 10 ("The proposal for the Directive was originally
limited to electronic databases but now includes analogue, including hard copy or traditional
print media, and electronic forms, including digital or online.").
122. Undoubtedly, the widespread use of the Internet has a significant impact on the
database industry and the figures regarding data entries. As the European Commission's
evaluation report noted-

2019]

DATA PRODUCER'S RIGHT

885

"

is therefore no surprise that the European Commission's evaluation of
the EU Database Directive focused on the metrics provided by the Gale
1 23
Directory of Databases.
The Commission also sent its restricted
online surveys to traditional database producers-namely, "500
European companies and organisations involved in the database
industry (publishers, suppliers of data and information, database
manufacturers, distributors, etc.)." 124
Today, however, the technological environment is dominated by
not only the Internet but also cloud computing, big data analytics,
the Internet of Things, machine learning, artificial intelligence, and
other technological advances.12 s One therefore cannot help but wonder
whether the advent of these new technologies warrants a fresh law and
policy debate in the area of data production. After all, the proposal for
a data producer's right targets the production of machine-generated
data. Unlike the sui generis database right, the proposed right does not
aim to provide incentives for "the obtaining, verification or
presentation of [database] contents." 1
In recent years, policy makers and commentators have
underscored the highly important and ever-growing role of data and
data-based innovation in our economy.127 From online platforms to

With respect to the overall decline of database "entries" as of 2001, the [European
Association of Directory and Database Publishers (EADP)] argues that database
"entries" decreased due to a shift toward the online provision of information.
The EADP further points out that database delivery has shifted from stand-alone
database products, such as CD-ROMs and dedicated on-line access to specific
databases, to "portal" based applications which enable a single point of access to
many databases. According to the EADP, this trend is not reflected in the [Gale
Directory of Databases] statistics.
COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMS., supranote 30, at 19.
123. See id at 5 ("The evaluation was conducted on the basis of ... information
received from the Gale Directory of Databases... , the largest existing database directory
which contains statistics indicating the growth of the global database industry since the
1970s.").
124. Id at 5 n.5.
125. See Yu, supra note 32, at 121 (listing the various technological advances).
126. Council Directive 96/6, supranote 31, art. 7(1).
127. As the European Commission declared in the opening paragraph of its
Communication on "Buildinga EuropeanDataEconomy":
Data has become an essential resource for economic growth, job creation and
societal progress. Data analysis facilitates the optimisation of processes and
decisions, innovation and the prediction of future events. This global trend holds
enormous potential in various fields, ranging from health, environment, food
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interconnected devices, a large quantity and variety of data are being
produced and collected every day.12 While some of these data are
collected the old-fashioned way, or through automation, others
require the development of, and investment in, new enabling
technologies,12 9 such as sensors, processors, embedded software, data
storage systems, and automated services. 130 Indeed, without these new
technologies, some of the data generated today may not be produced or
collected in the first place.
Thus, it is understandable why policy makers would seriously
consider offering protection to machine-generated data. The stakes of
not offering adequate protection in a data-driven society are just too
high. Today, data can be used and reused by many parties in all
sectors. 13 1 They can also be used alone or in combination with
previously nonexistent or inaccessible data.13 2 In addition, data can be
included in licensing arrangements or monetization deals. 133 In short,
security, climate and resource efficiency to energy, intelligent transport systems and
smart cities.
Commission Communication, supranote 2, at 2.
128. See HOTAES, supranote 1, at 16-18 (discussing the volume and variety ofbig data);
Drexl, supra note 17, at 264 (discussing the "three Vs" of big data' "volume, velocity and
variety').
129. See Michael Bailey, WIill Big Data Diminish the Role of Humans in Decision
Making?, in BIG DATA Is NOT A MONOUTH, supranote 7, at 163, 163 ('he data revolution is
creating new industries and revolutionizing existing ones, opening up completely new products
and operational capabilities."); Keith E. Maskus, FosteringInnovation in Digital Trade, in
INTELLECrUAL PRoPERTY AND DiGIrTAL TRADE, supra note 15, at 19, 21 ("[B]eyond basic ecommerce, the world is just beginning to understand the breadth and depth of digital services
that will be traded across borders to facilitate growing new industries, such as autonomous
driving vehicles, smart metering technologies, wearable smart fabrics, and the Internet of
Things.").
130. See M6nibre & Rudyk, supra note 15, at 32 ('By 2020 it is estimated that 26-30
billion devices in the home and workplace will be equipped with sensors, processors, and
embedded software, all connected to the Internet of Things.").
131. See MANYIKA ET AL., supranote 4, at 4 ("Big data has now reached every sector
in the global economy. Like other essential factors of production such as hard assets and
human capital, much of modem economic activity simply couldn't take place without it.");
ORG. FOR EcoN. Co-OPERAHON & DEv., supra note 4, at 27 ("[Data-driven innovation] is a
disruptive new source of growth that could transform all sectors in the economy.").
132. See sources cited supranote 8.
133. As Keith Maskus notedThat data have economic value at the macroeconomic level is mirrored by the fact
that they are intensely valuable for firms that generate or collect them online. This
value stems largely from the ability of firms to monetise data through selling their
characteristics to advertisers. It is estimated that Google's advertising revenue per
user was US$ 45 in early 2014 and US$ 9.45 for Facebook in the same year. Each
of these companies earned more than 90 percent of its revenue from online
advertising. Access to data also permits firms to tailor new products and services to
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the considerations for the data producer's right may be significantly
different from those earlier ones for sui generis database protection.
Moreover, it is one thing to lose a competitive edge in the database
industry, but quite another thing to lose a competitive edge in a
multitude of data-driven industries.
Notwithstanding the enormous value in data and their
considerable economic significance, it remains debatable whether new
rights should be introduced to protect machine-generated data in the
first place.134 After all, many of the targeted data will already be
generated regardless of the existence of these new rights. As Josef
Drexl explained, using the example of data generated by the networked
sensors in a smart car:
The data produced ... will be transferred to the manufacturer of that car.

The car manufacturer will be sufficiently motivated to generate data that
will guarantee smooth operation and maintenance of the car. Generation
of that data is very much part of the firm's business model....
Nor are additional incentives needed as regards the business model of
Internet platform operators (e.g., search engines, social media etc.), for
which the collection of personal data is the very core of the success of
the underlying business model."3 s
In addition, the benefits provided by the introduction of a data
producer's right may not outweigh the costs incurred by this particular
right. To help us think through the complex cost-benefit analyses and
meet the preferences of individual users, raising the value of data even more. The
current trend of massive private investments made in constructing databases is
additional evidence of the large economic stakes in this sector. As for the EU, it is
estimated that applications built on personalised data could provide benefits to its
firms and citizens of perhaps 61 trillion annually by 2020.
Maskus, supranote 129, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
134. See Drexl, supranote 17, at 291 ("In principle, in the data economy, no incentives
are needed for generating and commercialising data."); Kerber, supra note 5, at 997 ("Both
from a theoretical and empirical perspective there is no evidence that there are generally too
few incentives for producing and analyzing data in the digital economy.... Without an
incentive problem the main economic argument for establishing an exclusive property right
vanishes, if the use of the good is simultaneously non-rivalrous (as in the case of data)."); id.
at 990 ("[O]n the basis of our current preliminary knowledge-a new [intellectual property
right] on data is not necessary (especially due to the lack of an incentive problem for producing
and analyzing data).").
135. Drexl, srpranote 17, at 273; see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, DataProperty in the
System of Intellectual Property Law: Welcome Guest or Misf it?, in TRADING DATA IN THE
DIGrrAL EcoNOMY: LEGAL CONCEFTS AND TooLs 75, 80 (Sebastian Lobsse et al. eds., 2017)
("[M]uch machine data production occurs (nearly) automatically, often as a by-product of
industrial production or services, and it is hard to see why a legal incentive in the form of a
data property right would enhance it.").
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the multiple trade-offs involved, "6 this Part explores whether the
proposed data producer's right would meet the needs of our present
technological environment This Part further explores the proposed
right in light of the needs of the U.S. business and scientific
communities and society at large.
A.

TechnologicalNeeds

Although the increased use of big data analytics and the
proliferation of Internet-of-Things devices has made machinegenerated data highly important, many counterarguments exist to
caution against the introduction of a new data producer's right One
particularly strong argument concerns how good big data analyses
require the existence of large, comprehensive datasets"' If Stewart
Brand's famous quote about how information wants to be both free and
expensive can be modified in the big data context, that quote would
read, "Data want to be expensive, but they also want to be complete."'
Moreover, because of the changing nature of our technological
environment, many relevant data now reside in separate datasets and
often in multiple data storage systems.' In the past decade, computer
scientists and engineers have worked tirelessly to develop ways to
136. See Maskus, supra note 129, at 21 (noting the "multiple trade-offs" involved in
developing policy frameworks to promote emerging industries and new innovation).
137. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUIGER, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that "big data
relies on all the information, or at least as much as possible").
138. The original quote is as follows:
Information wants to be free because it has become so cheap to distribute,
copy, and recombine-tco cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive because it can
be immeasurably valuable to the recipient That tension will not go away. It leads
to endless wrenching debate about price, copyright, "intellectual property," and the
moral rightness of casual distribution, because each round of new devices makes the
tension worse, not better.
STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTINGIHE FUIURE AT MIT 202 (1987). This first few
words of the quote eventually became the hacker motto "Information wants to be free." Peter
K. Yu, P2Pand the Future ofPrivateCopying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 752 (2005) (quoting
BRAND, supra, at 202); see also Peter K. Yu, The CopyrightDivide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331,
381-83 (2003) (discussing hackers and their motto). For discussion of hackers, see generally
PEKKA HIMANEN, THE HACKER ETmc AND THE SPIRT OF THE INFORMATION AGE (2001);
STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1984).

139. See MANYIKA ET AL., supranote 4, at 12 ("To enable transformative opportunities,
companies will increasingly need to integrate information from multiple data sources.");
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUIER, supranote 1, at 46 ("Large datasets do not exist in any one
place; they tend to be split up across multiple hard drives and computers."); Riley, supranote
7, at 254 ("One of the biggest challenges for Big Data [in the health care space] is linking data
from multiple sources so that data describing an individual located in one source are linked
with data about the same individual in other sources.").
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analyze data without moving them from one storage system to
another.14 Thus, ifwe are to maximize our ability to undertake big data
analyses, such analyses may require greater sharing of data-which, in
turn, calls for greater data portability and interoperability.1 4 1
Indeed, allocating property rights to data producers--both
individual and corporate-could create major market barriers, leading
to what Rebecca Eisenberg and Michael Heller have described as
the "tragedy of the anticommons." 42 Instead of facilitating socially
productive uses of machine-generated data, the proposed data
producer's right would fragment the data market, undermining the
benefits of new, innovative data analytical techniques. 143
B.

BusinessNeeds

At the time of writing, U.S. companies dominate the global datadriven economy." Such dominance was indeed why many European
policy makers were so eager to introduce a new data producer's right 145
140.

See JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 78-80 (2018)

(discussing Hadoop and other efforts to move the algorithms to the data, as opposed to moving
the data themselves); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 23, at

30 ("Specialized software technology allows the data in multiple data centers (and spread
across tens of thousands of processors and hard-disk drives) to cooperate in performing the
tasks of data analytics, thereby providing both scaling and better performance.").
141. See discussion infra Part IV.A.5.
142. For discussions of the tragedy of the anti-commons, see generally MICHAEL
HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK EcoNoMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS

INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIvEs 49-78 (2008); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621
(1998); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch, 280 SCl. 698 (1998).
143. See Drexl, supra note 17, at 260 & n.16 (considering "multiple ownership of the
same data with considerable negative effects on access to that data" as "a situation of a 'tragedy
of the anti-commons' in which too many property rights in the same asset lead to inefficient
underuse of that asset"); Kerber, supra note 5, at 990 ("[The introduction of a new intellectual
property right in data] can be ... dangerous for innovation and competition in the digital
economy, because it might lead to considerable legal uncertainty, the monopolisation of
information, and impediments for the free flow of data that is so crucial for the digital
economy.").
144. See Reto Hilty, BigData:Ownershoand Use in the DigitalAge,in INTELLECIUAL
PROPERTY AND DIGiTAL TRADE, supra note 15, at 85, 89 ('The majority of the dominating
drivers ofthe digital economy are indeed US companies (the Googles, Facebooks, WhatsApps,
Amazons, and many others). And it is certainly true that those companies would not be as
successful as they are if they did not have access to 'big data', or, more precisely, to our data."
(emphasis omitted)).
145. See Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 49 ("Apparently inspiring this call for protecting
industrial data is the fear-common to other recent policy initiatives--that valuable European
assets are being misappropriated by large American companies").
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These policy makers hoped that the new right would help slow down
the competition from American technology giants, such as Google,
Apple, Facebook, and Amazon, which European commentators and
critics have lumped together with the acronym "GAFA."'"
Looking back, the EU policy makers' eagerness to out-compete
the United States was a primary reason for adopting the EU Database
Directive. 147 Recital 11 of the Directive states that "there is at present
a very great imbalance in the level of investment in the database sector
both as between the Member States and between the Community and
the world's largest database-producing third countries."'" Recital 12
further declares that "investment in modern information storage and
processing systems will not take place within the Community unless a
stable and uniform legal protection regime is introduced for the
protection of the rights of makers of databases."1 49
Thus far, U.S. technology companies have greatly benefited from
the free flow of data. While the proposal for a new data producer's
right could provide some benefits to these companies, due to their
ability to produce a prodigious quantity of data, that same proposal
150 It is no wonder
would also stifle corporate technological developments
that these for-profit companies did not lobby for stronger protection of
machine-generated data. Their refusal to do so may have indicated
their belief that the free flow of data would, on balance, provide more
overall benefits than greater data protection and a further reduction of
data flows."'
146. See Joe Nocera, Opinion, Europe'sGoogle Problem, N.Y. TiEs (Apr. 28,2015),

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/opinion/joe-nocem-europes-google-problem.html
(noting the use of this term in Europe).
147. See Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 49 ("The sui generis database producer's right
introduced in Europe in 1996 was similarly inspired by European fears of dominance by the
US database industry."). As Reichman and Samuelson recounted:
The Commission found that European database producers had to overcome several
comparative disadvantages in order to expand their share of the world market and to
catch up with the U.S. industry, which dominated the market and was growing at a
faster rate than its European counterpart. To overcome these disadvantages, the
Commission stressed the need for a single, integrated market, undistorted by
differing regulatory approaches, and for higher levels of intellectual property
protection, tailored to the needs of potential investors in database production, which
might stimulate additional investment in this sector.
Reichman & Samuelson, supranote 43, at 73-74.
148. Council Directive 96/9, supranote 31, recital 11.
149. Id recital 12.
150. See Drexl, supra note 17, at 260 ("[M]any firms are producers of data and have to
rely on access to data of other players at the same time.").
151. As Drexl suggested:
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Given the preference of leading U.S. technology companies, it is
understandable why U.S. negotiators have been actively negotiating
for language to foster the free flow of data at the global level. Cases
in point are the electronic commerce chapters found in bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral trade agreements,152 which the United States
has negotiated since the early 2000s."' Part IV.B.3 will discuss these
agreements in greater detail.
Data analysts will not gain a competitive edge by "owning data" at the expense of
their competitors. Rather, they will prevail in competition if they manage to have
better access to the various sources of big data, for which they will not rely on
ownership but contractual business relationships with the holders of such datasets,
on the one hand, and the effectiveness and accuracy of their big data analyses, on
the other hand. As regards the latter, it is more important that big data analysts
control the technology for big data analysis. For this, they will rely on copyright
protection in the software infrastructure and possibly technical know-how rather
than data ownership. The same holds true for firms that deliver-typically softwarebased-tools for big data analysis of other firms.
Id at 274 (footnote omitted); see also MAY AGRAWAL Er AL., PREDICION MACHINES: THE
SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 189 (2018) (noting that technology
companies understand that learning in the artificial intelligence space "often requires customers
who are willing to provide data").
152. As the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative noted in its summary of the TPP
electronic commerce chapter
[This] chapter includes commitments ensuring that companies and consumers can
access and move data freely (subject to safeguards, such as for privacy), which will
help ensure free flow of the global information and data that drive the Internet and
the digital economy. These commitments, along with others on market access and
national treatment, combine to help prevent unreasonable restriction, such as the
arbitrary blocking of websites.
... [D]ata flows are the building blocks for all digital trade, and barriers to them are
among the most serious impediments to the future of digital trade. Impediments to
such flows affect not only technology companies, but almost every sector of the
economy from manufacturing to farming and small businesses-all of which now
depend on digital technology to provide the innovation and efficiency that drive
economic growth.
Electronic Commerce, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https/A/ustr.gov/sites/default/lfles/
TPP-Chapter-Summary-Electronic-Commerce.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). See generally
Anupam Chander & Uyar P. 1, DataNationalism, 64 EMORY LJ. 677 (2015) (discussing
data localization measures).
153. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Ansehn Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free trade
agreements in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall,
Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free
Trade Agreement: Lessons for US. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259
(criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Yu, supra note 68, at 392-400
(discussing the growing use of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements to push for
higher intellectual property standards); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS
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Moreover, ifwe can draw lessons from the EU Database Directive,
a key lesson relating to this subpart is that well-intentioned efforts to
improve global competitiveness through data protection does not
always succeed. Indeed, commentators readily admit that the adoption
of the EU Database Directive was a mistake.'" Considering that the
current global norms already favor U.S. technology companies, one has
to question the wisdom of gambling on a new policy that may or may
not benefit these companies.
C

Scientific Needs

Like the EU Database Directive and U.S. sui generis database
legislation, the proposal for a new data producer's right could
undermine the ongoing effort by the research and library communities
to share data with others through open science and open data
initiatives. 155 The proposed right would create both actual and transaction
costs."' As Jerome Reichman, Paul Uhlir, and Tom Dedeurwaerdere
noted in their recent book:
[I]nter-university exchanges of data are increasingly subject to high
transaction costs, delays, and a growing risk of anti-commons effects,
that is, too many intellectual property rights and commercial interests
making it difficult to build comprehensive or complex databases. This
problem is particularly acute in cases of transnational scientific
collaboration. As relations between universities and industry become
more intense, and as public universities receive a smaller share of their
budgets from state legislatures, the universities tend to view each other
L. REV. 953, 961-86 (2011) (critically examining the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and
plurilateral trade agreements).
154. See Davison, supra note 40, at 829 ("It is difficult to draw any conclusion other
than that the adoption of the [EU Database] Directive was a mistake.").
155. See Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 10, at 36 (noting "the
[European] Commission's policy on open science and open access"); MAYER-SCHONBERGER
& CulKR, supranote 1, at 116-18 (discussing the value of open data and highlighting the open
data initiatives around the globe); REIcHMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 367 ("[A] number of
public or publicly funded organizations have decided to make their data holdings openly
available.").
156. As Jerome Reichman and Paul Uhlir observed in the late 1990s:
[U]nder the current [sui generis database protection] proposals, scientists and
engineers would face rising transaction costs when attempting to create complex
databases from multiple public and private sources. Also predicted are higher costs
due to the burdens of administering national data centers and of carrying out related,
large-scale management activities that currently benefit from the policy of open and
unrestricted access to scientific and technical data.
Reichman & Uhlir, supranote 61, at 816.
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as competitors, rather than as partners in a common mission. Their
industrial partners are correspondingly more likely to impose their own
proprietary terms of exchange on the universities.'

To a large extent, some of these concerns resemble those earlier
concerns that commentators expressed when Congress was actively

considering sui generis database protection bills two decades ago.15 8
Compared with that time, the present stakes are much higher, especially
when one considers the myriad benefits provided by the free exchange

of data for scientific pursuits and the growing success of open science
and open data initiatives. If the development of sui generisprotection
for databases was already ill-advised at that time, granting sui generis
protection to machine-generated data seems clearly wrongheaded.
D.

PersonalNeeds

The increasing use of data has created considerable concern about
how data-whether personal or anonymized-are being used. The

arrival of new Internet-of-Things devices has also led to the
development of what Frank Pasquale called the "black box society.""'
As he observed, "Black boxes embody a paradox of the so-called
information age: Data is becoming staggering in its breadth and depth,
yet often the information most important to us is out of our reach,

available only to insiders."'1" Using popular services such as Google,
Facebook, and Twitter as illustrations, he elaborated:
Without knowing what Google actually does when it ranks sites, we
cannot assess when it is acting in good faith to help users, and when it is
biasing results to favor its own commercial interests. The same goes for
status updates on Facebook, trending topics on Twitter, and even network
management practices at telephone and cable companies. All these are
protected by laws of secrecy and technologies of obfuscation.'
157. REIcHMANET AL., supra note 8, at 366-67 (footnotes omitted).
158. See sources cited supranote 80.
159.

FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SocIsrY: THE SECREr ALGORTHMS THAT

CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); see also Peppet, supranote 12 (advancing a new
regulatory approach to address problems relating to discrimination, privacy, security, and
consent in the Internet-of-Things environment).
160. PASQUALE, supranote 159, at 191; see alsoNeil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King,
Three ParadoxesofBig Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONuNE 41, 42-43 (2013) ("Big data promises
to use . .. data to make the world more transparent, but its collection is invisible, and its tools
and techniques are opaque, shrouded by layers of physical, legal, and technical privacy by
design.").
161. PASQUALE, supra note 159, at 9; see also Kent R. Anderson, Can We Anticopate
Some UnintendedConsequences ofBig Data?, in BIG DATA Is NOT A MONOLITH, supra note
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Although most of the ongoing discussion in what Pasquale
described as the "era of runaway data"' 62 has thus far focused on
personal data, it is unclear when seemingly anonymized machinegenerated data would become personalor personally identifying. As
one commentator observed, "Even when aggregating non-personal
data (e.g. machine data from a board computer), powerful correlation
algorithms working on big data may be able to correlate such data with
an individual person, thus transforming non-personal data into personal
data."163 Likewise, Viktor Mayer-Schanberger and Kenneth Cukier
lamented, "Given enough data, perfect anonymization is impossible no
matter how hard one tries." 164 Their book showed disturbingly how the
New York 7mes staff and researchers at the University of Texas at
Austin were able to reconstruct seemingly anonymized data from
companies such as AOL and Netflix.' 61
To some extent, the increased demands for transparency in
relation to these "black box" devices resonate with the growing
demands for transparency in international intellectual property
negotiations. The latter demands were shown vividly by the protestsi16
against controversial U.S. legislation, 67 the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade

7, at 117, 124 ("The data in Google flu trends is presented as is, and cannot be analyzed by
outside parties.").
162. PASQUALE, supra note 159, at 19.
163. Peter Bitiner, Intellectual Property Management Challenges Arising from
Pervasive Digitalisation: The Effect of the Digital Transformation on Daily Life, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE, supra note 15, at 67, 71; see also ARI EZRA
WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 65 (2018)

("Any individual piece of information may not be particularly intimate or personal, but its sum
total can paint a detailed picture.").
164.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supranote 1, at 155.

165.

See id at 154-55 (recounting these incidents).

166.

See BILL D. HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF

COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY 194-200 (2013) (discussing the negative reactions to the SOPA
and PIPA legislation); MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: How CORPORATE

LOBBYING THREATENs ONLINE FREEDOMS 107-14 (2013) (discussing how the EU effort to
adopt the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) led to massive street protests
throughout Europe in the middle of winter); EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE: How
PEOPLE DEFEATED HOLLYWOOD AND SAvED THE INTERNET-FOR Now 55-78 (2013)

(discussing the Wikipedia blackout and its aftermath).
167. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real Online
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th
Cong. (2011); see also Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of TransborderIntellectualProperty
Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOuRSE 16, 28-33 (2012) (providing criticisms of these
two pieces of legislation).
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Agreement," and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).'" Both sets of
demands reflect changing consumer expectations. In the mid-1990s,
when Congress was actively considering sui generis database
protection bills to match the EU Database Directive, Boyle issued a
pioneering call for the creation of "a politics of intellectual property.""
Two decades later, however, these politics have slowly emerged,"' and
the demands for greater transparency now inform the debate on issues
ranging from international intellectual property negotiations to the
construction or design of Internet-of-Things devices.172
E.

Summary

This Part has shown that while data have become highly valuable
and greater protection could help lock in their enormous value, the
proposal for a new data producer's right is misguided. That proposal
does not meet the present technological, business, scientific, and
personal needs, especially those in the United States. Given this
assessment, it is doubtful that the proposed data producer's right would
be, on balance, socially expedient. Even if the proposed right would
168. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, openedfor signature Oct. 1, 2011 (not in
force), http://www.mofi.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/actal 105 en.pdf.
For
discussions of a lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiations, see generally David S. Levine,
Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy National Security, and the Creation ofInternational Intellectual
Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. LJ. 105 (2012); Peter K Yu, Sir Secret (and Now
Open) FearsofACTA, 64 SMUL. REv. 975, 998-1019 (2011).
169. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016 (not in force), https*//ustr.gov/
trade-a
sfree-trade-a-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter TPP
Agreement].

170. James Boyle, A Politics ofIntellectualProperty: Environmentalism for the Net?,
47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997).
171. See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE LJ. 804 (2008) (discussing the growing
mobilization in the access to knowledge area and the emergence of new politics of intellectual
property).
172. As Neil Richards and Jonathan King observed:
[Wie must recognize that big data requires transparency. Transparency has long
been a cornerstone of civil society as it enables informed decision making by
governments, institutions, and individuals alike. The many secondary uses of big
data analytics, and the resulting incentives of companies and governments to share
data, place heightened importance on transparency in our age of big data.
Transparency can help prevent abuses of institutional power while also encouraging
individuals to feel safe in sharing more relevant data to make better big data
predictions for our society.
Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 393, 396
(2014); see also Cate, supra note 15, at 18 ("Whenever big data are used in ways that affect
individuals, there must be effective transparency and redress.").
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provide important incentives to facilitate the production of machinegenerated data, such benefits might not compensate for the many costs
this new right would incur.
IV. FuTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Drawing on past and present developments, the previous two
Parts have shown why the proposal for a new data producer's right is
ill-advised, especially when introduced in the United States. This Part
turns to the complications the proposed right would create in relation
to the future development of a sound and holistic data governance
regime. This Part breaks these complications down into two subgroups,
based on whether they are within or outside the area of machinegenerated data.
Focusing on endogenous complications, subpart A points out that
the proposed data producer's right would create more questions than
answers. If policy makers strongly believe that such a right is needed
to provide incentives for the production of machine-generated data,
they will have to provide satisfactory answers to these difficult
questions.
Subpart B then turns to exogenous complications. This subpart
shows that the proposal for a new data producer's right would create
considerable complications not only in the intellectual property system
but also in other international regulatory systems, such as those
governing privacy, trade, and investment. The awareness of these
complications is highly important because the issues are increasingly
connected, especially when policy makers explore ways to develop a
sound and holistic data governance regime.
A.

Endogenous Complications

Thus far, commentators have provided different justifications for
the introduction of a new data producer's right As Herbert Zech, a
professor at the University of Basel in Switzerland and the right's
leading proponent,m' explained:
[A]s in classic intellectual property rights, one could bring forward the
argument that incentives are created to generate and to reveal data (and
hence, indirectly, to promote innovations that are made possible through
173. See Herbert Zech, A Legal Frameworkfor a Data Economy in the European
Digital Single Market: Rights to Use Data, 11 J. INrELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 460, 470 (2016)
(advancing the proposal for a data producer's right).
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the use of data) and that markets for information goods (that otherwise
would not be tradable or would only be tradable with higher transaction
costs) are created. Another important aspect seems to be that such legal
regulation would clearly determine who benefits from the use of data.
This would prevent that machines are designed in a way that they are
difficult to be read out or that other mechanisms would be created which
grant de facto exclusivity. Such a regulation not only saves costs, but
would promote a culture of transparency, as "open data" does. The data
producer right would have the same function for "open data" as the
copyright has for "open source" and "open content". 174

Given these justifications, the European Commission's eagerness
to offer protection to machine-generated data is indeed not difficult to

explain, even if one does not take into account the heavy lobbying
by the automotive industry.17' After all, uncertainty over the rights
involved in the data environment could discourage investment in datarelated innovations.' 7 1 Such uncertainty could also create disputes,
especially in view of the fast-increasing value in, and multifaceted uses
of, machine-generated data.177
Notwithstanding the need to address these understandable
concerns, the proposal for a new data producer's right has raised many

difficult policy questions that have to be addressed before the creation
of this new right. Even if one could provide a fairly strong justification

for this right-such as when its creation is needed to encourage data
producers to disseminate or share machine-generated data for socially

174. Id
175. See Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 48 (noting the "demands of the automotive
industry').
176. See Commission Conunuication, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that the creation of a
new data producer's right "would aim at clarifying the legal situation"); Zech, supra note 173,
at 470 ("[An] important aspect [of the data producer's right] seems to be that such legal
regulation would clearly determine who benefits from the use of data."). But see Drexl, supra
note 17, at 275 ("As regards data ownership that is recognised independently of factual control
over data in an environment where individual data may constantly be integrated and arranged
in different datasets, data ownership is more likely to reduce transparency and increase the risk
of unintentional infringement of rights.").
177. See Drexl, supra note 17, at 275 ("[Nlew property rights will always give rise to
additional conflicts and litigation."); Timo Minssen & Justin Pierce, Big Data and Intellectual
Property Rights in the Health andLfe Sciences, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS,
supra note 7, at 311, 311 (noting the "fierce controversies between data 'owners,' data
researchers, and entities that provide enabling technologies, large research infiastructures, and
standardization platforms").
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beneficial purposes"1 -answers to these questions will still be needed.
This subpart discusses each set of policy questions in tum.
1.

Modality of Protection

The first set of policy questions concerns the modality of
protection. As far as intellectual property laws are concerned, policy
makers and commentators tend to create new rights utilizing the
property model. Despite its many strengths, this model is not always
the best for developing intellectual property protection."' Nor is it the
only model for developing such protection. As Part IILA noted, the
interests of data producers could be easily protected using trade secrecy,
unfair competition law, cost-sharing arrangements, private contracts, or
technological protection measures."'o One should not forget that the
original proposal for the EU Database Directive was based on unfair
competition law principles."'
178. This quid-pro-quo arrangement is generally used to justify patent protection.
Without such protection, many inventions may remain locked up in secrecy. See EDTHITILTON
PENROSE, TiHE EcoNOMICS OF mE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYsTEM 31-34 (1951) (discussing
the disclosure of secrets as a rationale of the patent system); see also A. Samuel Oddi, The
InternationalPatentSystem andThird WorldDevelopment: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE U.
831, 851 ("The argument most commonly made is that a patent incentive is needed to induce
the transfer of technology because patent owners would otherwise be unwilling to transfer their
valuable technology in the form of trade secrets due to the relative weakness of trade secret
law in developing countries.").
179. See Yu, supra note 29, at 792 ("As far as policy options are concerned, there is a
misguided tendency for policymakers in both developed and less developed countries to
assume that the property rights model is the only model, or the best one, that is compliant with
the TRIPs Agreement or other commitments under the intemational intellectual property
regime."); Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human
Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 709, 735 (2007) ("[A]lthough a property-based intellectual
property system would offer the needed protection to material interests in intellectual creations,
such a regime is not the only acceptable, or even the best, modality of protection that can be
used to realize the right to the protection of material interests in intellectual creations.").
180. See Drexl, supranote 17, at 292 ("As regards access negotiations between private
parties, the Commission could support schemes of private ordering that enable private
initiatives to pool data of multiple data holders."); Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 52 ("[N]onproperty regimes such as contracts and trade secret protection might occasionally do the job,
as would technical protection measures that create de facto ownership positions."); see also
supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
181. As Reichman and Samuelson recounted
The Commission's initial approach was premised on the absence of a
harmonized system of unfair competition legislation to safeguard "the investment of
considerable human, technical and financial resources" in the making of databases
that "can be copied ... at a fraction of the cost needed to design them
independently." The logical solution was, therefore, to codify a new type of unfair
competition law. Such a law, loosely modelled on existing laws that protected trade
secrets or confidential information, would repress conduct amounting to the
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To be sure, a data producer's right established through trade
secrecy will be very different from one utilizing the property model. 182
While the latter prevents any party from using the generated data absent
any permissible limitation or exception, the former requires data
producers to undertake reasonable precautions to ensure that the data
remain protected through secrecy." Likewise, although contracts
offer protection to data producers, such protection is limited to those
enjoying the privity of contract '8
"misappropriation" of an electronic database producer's investment without
imposing either legal barriers to entry or the social costs of actual or legal secrecy.
To this end, the Commission proposed simply to forbid the "unfair extraction" of
data from an electronic database for commercial purposes without the second
comer's having expended independent effort to collect and verify similar
information. The first proposed draft E.C. Directive accordingly provided a ten-year
period of lead time in which the database maker could recoup his or her investment
in a noncopyrightable electronic database while preventing copiers from engaging
in for-profit extraction or reutilization of the factual contents, in whole or in
substantial part
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 81 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Commision
Proposalfor a Council Directive on the Legal ProtectionofDatabases, at 59, COM (92) 24
final (May 13, 1992)).
182. As Drexl explained.
[A]lthough the Trade Secrets Directive was not drafted to meet the needs of the data
economy, trade secrets protection can provide a sound approach to protecting firms
in the data economy to some extent Rather than recognising exclusive control over
any use of protected information, as would be typical for intellectual property
regimes, EU trade secrets law implements a tort law approach that bans specific
conduct related to the acquisition, dissemination and use of trade secrets that can be
considered as unfair. It is thereby better suited to balance the interest in protection
and in free flow of information than the property approach.
Drexl, supranote 17, at 291. But see Commission Staf Working Document, supranote 10, at
20 ("It is doubtful that individual data generated by interconnected machines and devices could
be regarded as 'trade secret' in the sense of this Directive, mostly because of its lack of
commercial value as individual data .. ..").
183. See Council Directive 2016/943, art 2(lXc), 2016 OJ. (L 157) 1 (requiring a trade
secret to have been "subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully
in control of the information, to keep it secret"); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (amended
1985), 14 UL.A. 536 (2005) (requiring a trade secret to have been "the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy"). See generally Robert G.
Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement ofReasonableSecrecy Precautions,in
THE LAw AND THEORY OF TRADE SECREcY: A HANDBOOKOF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 46

(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (discussing the need for
precautionary measures).
184. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,1454 (7th Cir. 1996) ('Contracts ...
generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please ... ."); NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 61 ("The fact that contract terms are only effective between the
contracting parties and not binding on third parties who may get access to the database has
been cited as a weakness, since many databases must be publicly distributed in order to be
commercially viable." (footnote omitted)); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 137
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The different protections offered by these rights were indeed the
focus of the European Commission. As the Commission stated in
its staff working document, the proposed right "could be envisaged
as a right in rem" or "as a set of purely defensive rights."' As the
Commission elaborated:
[The data producer's] right could be envisaged as a right in rem and
assign the exclusive right to utilise certain data, including the right to
licence its usage. This would include a set of rights enforceable against
any party independent of contractual relations thus preventing firther use
of data by third parties who have no right to use the data, including the
right to claim damages for unauthorised access to and use of data.
Alternatively, instead of creating the data producer right as a right in rm,
it could be conceived of as a set of purely defensive rights. This option
would follow the choice made in the design of the protection given to
know-how by the Trade Secrets Protection Directive. Its objective would
be to enhance the sharing of data by giving at least the defensive elements
of an in mn right, i.e. the capacity for the de facto data holder to sue third
parties in case of illicit misappropriation of data. This approach thus
equates to a protection of a de facto "possession" rather than to the
concept of "ownership". 186

The Commission's explanation is particularly instructive on issues
relating to the modality of protection. While the "right in rem"
discussion covers the strengths of the property model, the "defensive
rights" approach steers the protection toward trade secrecy or unfair
competition laws. 187

("[Cjontract law has significant limitations when mass-marketed information products are sold
to persons not in privity with the makers."); see also Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survivs:
Rethinking the Copyrght-Contract Conflict, 103 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1209-13 (2017)
(discussing contractual privity and control over information).
185. Commission Staff Working Document, supranote 10, at 33 (emphasis omitted).
186. Id at 33-34 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
187. As Reto Hilty noted.
[The "defensive rights"] approach resembles "possession" rather than "ownership;"
it is comparable to the possession of (as such not protected) know-how, and the
concept of legal protection may be similar to the one applied in Directive 2016/943
on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets)
against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.
Hilty, supranote 144, at 89.
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Allocation of Rights

The second set of policy questions relates to allocation of rights.
If the property model is to be used, such allocation will focus on
ownership interests. Thus far, three groups of players have fairly
strong claims to machine-generated data, even though one could
arguably include other groups in the mix."' In his proposal for a data
producer's right, Zech described a data producer as "the economically
responsible operator of equipment that generates the data." 8 9 This
position contrasts interestingly with extant European copyright laws
that consider those making necessary arrangements for the creation of
computer-generated works as authors.'
For illustrative purposes, this subpart considers the data produced
by the networked sensors in a smart car-an example that has been
used ad nauseum in discussions of machine-generated data.1 91 Most
188. See Farkas, supra note 10, at 6-7 (suggesting as potential owners of the data
produced by the networked sensors in a smart car "[tihe owner of the car, the actual user of the
car, the car manufacturer, the manufacturer of the sensor or communicating devices built in the
networked car, companies like navigation service providers [and] the road construction
authorities"); Hilty, supra note 144, at 91 ("[I]n the case of the traffic app, who should be the
'owner?' Should it be the car producer, the supplier of the sensor or control unit, the app
producer, the service provider, the car driver-or even perhaps another party?"); see also
Drexl, supra note 17, at 277 ("[I]n a complex world of networks where a considerable number
of different players collaborate in generating value, not least by contributing their data, the
allocation of data ownership is particularly difficult."); Kerber, supra note 5, at 991 ("An
especially difficult problem seems to be the question to whom such an [intellectual property
right] should be granted: Should it be the data producer, who codifies the data . . ,or the firm
which is economically responsible for the production of data, or the firm which can benefit
most from the data?").
189. Zech, supra note 173, at 469. In its staff working document, the European
Commission defined this term more broadly:
One of the criteria for allocating the right could be to take into account the
investments done and the resources put into the creation of the data. Such
investments are made most often by two sides: The manufacturer of sensor-equipped
machines, tools or devices (generating the data) who has invested in to the
development and market commercialisation of the machine, tool or device and the
economic operators using such machines, tools or devices paying a purchase price
or lease and have to amortise the machine, tool or device.
Commission Staff Working Document, supranote 10, at 35.
190. See e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (Eng.) ("In the
case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author
shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the
work are undertaken."); Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2000) § 21(f)
(Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli2000/act/28/enacted/en/html (stipulating that the
author of a computer-generated work shall be "the person by whom the arrangements
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken").
191. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, supranote 10, at 25 ("Access to
and re-use of non-personal or anonymised data have been subject to intensive discussions with
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certainly, the car owner has a strong claim to these data, as the owner
will need them to repair the car.192 For privacy protection, the owner
may also need the ability to opt out from automatic data generation,
especially if he or she does not trust the anonymization process.'9 3 The
owner's demand for opting out is easy to understand. While the
produced or collected car data may provide valuable information
about traffic patterns, road conditions, and engine performance,'"
they could also reveal highly personal information about the owner's
driving habits.19 5
Like the car owner, the car manufacturer also has a strong claim
to these data, as the manufacturer will need them to improve car design,
anticipate problems generated by design defects, and develop solutions
to address those problems.1" In recent years, some car manufacturers
respect to data generated by the 'smart' and connected car.'); Wolfgang Kerber & Jonas
Severin Frank, Data Governance Regimes in the Digital Economy: The Example ofConnected
Cars (Jan. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract-3064794 (advancing
an economic theoretical framework to analyze the complex problem of data governance in
connected cars).
192. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER& CUIGER, supra note 1, at 133 ("Carstoday are stuffed
with chips, sensors, and software that upload performance data to the carmakers' computers
when the vehicle is serviced."); Drexl, supra note 17, at 262 ("[S]mart cars nowadays collect
data ... for providing better and timely-even predictive-matenance services."); Farkas,
supranote 10, at 6 ("A networked car might communicate details about traffic, favourite routes
and road conditions to the car owner. . . ."); see also Commission Staf Working Document,
supranote 10, at 25 (discussing the handling of data from connected vehicles).
193. Cf Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 13 ("Where personal data are
concerned, the individual will retain his right to withdraw his consent at any time after
authorising the use."). Nevertheless, such opting out may not always be easy, given that some
of the produced or collected data are essential to the car's safe and effective operation.
194. See Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 48-49 (noting the observation of European
Commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society Gtinther Oettinger that "modem sensorequipped cars automatically generate and collect large amounts of data-on traffic and road
conditions, engine performance, etc.").
195. See Drexl, supra note 17, at 262 (noting that "cars may ... register the driving
habits of the driver"); Farkas, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that the data communicated by
networked cars "can be used to avoid.. . driving behaviour relevant for insurers").
196. As the Commission explained in its staffworking document
In case the right is allocated to the economic operator using the machine, tool or
device, exceptions may need to be made for the manufacturer of such machine, tool
or device. The manufacturer may not only have a legitimate interest to use such data
for the purposes of further improving product design, but also may have a legal
obligation to monitor the behaviour of his products on the market. In some
circumstances, there may be good reasons not to allocate the ownership to the
economic operator using the machine, tool or device-or not to allow the full range
of actions usually available to an "owner"--notably on safety or security linked to
the relevant data.
Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 10, at 35-36 (footnote omitted). Likewise,
Michael Bailey observed.
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have suggested, somewhat counterintuitively, that car owners do not
actually have ownership interests despite paying handsomely for their
vehicles." If these owners did not even own the cars they bought, it
would be highly unlikely for them to own the data generated by the
sensors in those cars.19 8
As if the fight over data control between these two parties were
not complicated enough, the software developer has an equally
strong claim to the data produced by these sensors. Just as the car
owner and the car manufacturer need data to repair or improve the car,
the software designer also needs data to improve the software. 9
Big data is changing how automakers and firms do recalls. Firms can now
store many more data about how products are produced, sold, and delivered, and
link these to all reported problems and complaints, allowing companies to identify
the source of problems and connect related problems. General Motors was able to
limit the recall of a certain model of car with a faulty valve to only four cars because
of its advanced manufacturing tracking.
Bailey, supra note 129, at 166 (citation omitted); see also MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER,
supra note 1, at 133 ("The ability to gather data about how car parts are actually used on the
road-and to reincorporate this data to improve them-is turning out to be a big competitive
advantage for the firms that can get hold of the information."); Drexl, supra note 17, at 289
("[A] car manufacturer collects geographic data through the cars' sensors for the purpose of
predictive maintenance....").
197. This suggestion occurred in the U.S. Copyright Office's 2015 rulemaking
proceeding concerning the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA. See Peter K Yu, The
Anatomy of the Hwnan Rights Frameworkfor IntellectualProperty, 69 SMU L. REV. 37, 89
(2016). As I recounted in an earlier article:
In its submission arguing against the introduction of exceptions in Class 21 for
"vehicle software-diagnosis, repair, or modification," John Deere claimed that
those who purchased its tractors did not have ownership interests in those vehicles;
instead, they merely "receive[d] an implied license for the life of the vehicle to
operate the vehicle, subject to any warranty limitations, disclaimers or other
contractual limitations in the sales contract or documentation." Automobile
manufacturers also made similar arguments supporting the post-sale control of cars
they produced. As General Motors stated in its submission, those who own its cars
do not own the computer software in the vehicles even though such software, it
admits, is essential to the vehicle's safe operation.
Id at 89-90 (footnote omitted) (quoting Comment from Deere & Co. on Proposed Exemption
to the U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 27, 2015), httpsi//copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments032715/class/2021/JohnDeereClass211201_2014.pdf).
198. See Drexl, supranote 17, at 267 ("The property in the car as a physical object does
not automatically extend to the commercial exploitation of the data that are produced by the
sensors of that car.").
199. See PAUL R. DAUGHERIY& HI JAMES WILSON, HUMAN+ MACHINE: REIMAGINING
WORK IN THE AGE OF Al 114 (2018) (noting the use of data and artificial intelligence systems
for "diagnosing and fixing problems with [information technology] systems"); MAYERSCHONBERGER & CUIER, supra note 1, at 105 (noting the potential use of voice-translation
records to improve speech-recognition technology); id at 107 (noting that mobile phone
"[olperators have long used [the data about where and when the phones connect to base
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Moreover, the programmers hired by this developer have designed the
software to enable the sensors and the car computer to produce and
collect data. In cases involving copyright law and artificial
intelligence, commentators have widely agreed that computer
programmers should have ownership interests in computer-generated
works.2" As Annemarie Bridy observed, "Intuition and the principle
of transitivity both suggest that the programmer of generative software
is the logical owner of the copyright in the works generated by his or
her software. He or she is, after all, the author of the authorof the
works." 201
Nevertheless, if considerable progress has been made for
machines to conduct "deep learning" 202 or "artificial general
stations] to fine-tune the performance of their networks, deciding where to add or upgrade
infrastructure"); REICHMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 323 ("One of the most promising useradded resources resulting from data accumulation and integration is the establishment of
incremental machine learning and automatic interpretation capabilities based on the application
of semantic web and integrative techniques to large amounts of data.'.
200. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WoRKs, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION O NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WoRKS 45 (1979) ("[W]e confront the question of who is the author of a work produced

through the use of a computer. The obvious answer is that the author is [the] one who employs
the computer."); Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially

Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 21 (finding "the programmer of generative
software ... the logical owner of the copyright in [computer-generated] works"); Arthur R.
Miller, CopyrightProtectionfor Computer Programs,Databases, and Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L.REv. 977, 1049 (1993) ('[The human

element in the creation of [computer-generated] works is sufficient to sustain their
copyrightability and resolve any question of authorship."); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
OwnershipRights in Computer-GeneratedWorks, 47 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1185,1192 (1986) ("[I]n
general, the user of a computer generator program should be considered the author of a
computer-generated work, and should be free to exploit this product commercially."); see also
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second DigitalDisruption:Streaming & the

Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 NYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 65),
https://ssn.com/abstract=3226566 ("[E]ven in a world where data-driven authorship is the
norm, we would still recognize that authors are laboring-at least where authors are assisted
by data and algorithms, rather than being entirely displaced by them.").
201. Bridy, supranote 200, at 21.
202. As a government report on artificial intelligence observed.
In recent years, some of the most impressive advancements in machine learning
have been in the subfield of deep learning, also known as deep network leaming.
Deep learning uses structures loosely inspired by the human brain, consisting of a
set of units (or "neurons"). Each unit combines a set of input values to produce an
output value, which in turn is passed on to other neurons downstream. For example,
in an image recognition application, a first layer of units might combine the raw data
of the image to recognize simple patterns in the image; a second layer of units might
combine the results of the first layer to recognize pattems-of-pattems; a third layer
might combine the results of the second layer, and so on.

2019]

DATA PRODUCER'S RIGHT

905

intelligence,""o the rights of the software developer may be called into
question. In that scenario, the legislature or the court may take a
pragmatic approach to create a legal fiction to respond to technological
change. A paradigmatic example of such a legal fiction is the workmade-for-hire doctrine in copyright law.' Although authors have to
be humans 205 -as the U.S. Copyright Office recently made clear
following the many interesting questions generated by the so-called
"monkey selfie'"-corporations are nonhuman, institutional authors
that have enjoyed protection under the Copyright Act.` Given the
ready availability of this legal fiction, some commentators have
suggested the use of the work-made-for-hire doctrine to address the
complicated relationship between machines and authorial works.2 08
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THBE PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 9 (2016). See generallyETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING:

THE NEW Al 104-09 (2016) (discussing deep learning); KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 140,
at 121-30 (discussing neural networks and deep learning); THIERRY POIBEAu, MACHINE
TRANSLATION 181-95 (2017) (discussing deep learning in the machine translation context).
203. See Michael Guihot et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate
Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 396 (2017) ("[Artificial general
intelligence] is said to possess 'a reasonable degree ofself-understanding and autonomous selfcontrol, [has] the ability to solve a variety of complex problems in a variety of contexts, and
[can] learn to solve new problems that [it] didn't know about at the time of [its] creation."'
(alterations in original) (quoting Ben Goertzel & Cassio Pennachin, Preface to ARTIFICIAL
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, at vi (Ben Goertzel & Cassio Pennachin eds., 2007))). See generally
ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, supra (collecting articles that discuss the engineering of
general intelligence).
204. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (providing the work-made-for-hire doctrine).
205.

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1: COPYRIGHT BASICS

1 (2017),

https://www.copynght.gov/circs/circOl.pdf ("An original work of authorship is a work that is
independently created by a human author and possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity."); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUMOF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACICES ch.

300, at 17 (3d ed. 2017) (listing as an example of works that the U.S. Copyright Office will not
register a "photograph taken by a monkey").
206. See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that animals, as
nonhumans, "lack[] statutory standing under the Copyright Act"). Although the appellate court
and commentators often refer to the animal plaintiffas a monkey, Naruto is actually a Sulawesi
crested macaque, which is a black ape. See id
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title
208. As Bridy observed.
The work made for hire doctrine is a more fitting framework within which to situate
the problem of [artificial intelligence] authorship because it represents an existing
mechanism for directly vesting ownership of a copyright in a legal person who is
not the author-in-fact ofthe work in question.... With respect to works of [artificial
intelligence] authorship, treating the programmer like an employer---as the authorin-law of a work made by another-would avoid the problem of vesting rights in a
machine and ascribing to a machine the ability to respond to copyright's incentives.
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Meanwhile, others have suggested that the ownership questions should
be determined on a case-by-case basis.20 9 Some commentators have
gone even further to call for the recognition of machines as authors and
inventors. 210
It would also avoid the expedient logic that conflates the author's author (Le., the
programmer) with the actual author (Le., the generative program).
Bridy, supranote 200, at 26 (footnote omitted); see also Bailey, supranote 129, at 171 ("Firms
would. . .be anxious to understand if an artificial intelligence would be treated as an employee
under the law or could sign legally binding agreements such as no-compete contracts ... ");
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and
Accountability in the 3A Era-TheHuman-Like Authors Are Already Here-A New Model,
2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 707-18 (advancing a work-made-for-hire model to govem works
generated by Al systems).
209. As Jani McCutcheon explained
Depending on the facts, there is sufficient flexibility in the provision to
accommodate a range of candidates as the deemed author, and it would be imprudent
and unnecessary to nominate only one for all circumstances. Instead, all relevant
factors should be considered and balanced against each other. While it may be
convenient to have greater consistency and predictability with a 'bright-line' rule, a
case by case consideration may be the only possible approach.
Jani McCutcheon, Curing the Authorless Void Protecting Computer-Generated Works
FollowingIceTV and Phone Directories, 37 MELB. U. L. REv. 46, 68 (2013); see also Robert
C. Denicola, Ex Machina: CopyrightProtectionfor Computer-GeneratedWorks, 69 RuTGERS
U. L. REv. 251, 286-87 (2016) ("A computer user who initiates the creation of computergenerated expression should be recognized as the author and copyright owner of the resulting
work.").
210. As Ryan Abbott observed in the patent context:
I argue that we should recognise computers as inventors. This will functionally
produce more invention because it will incentivise the development of creative
computers. That is because allowing computer owners to patent the output of their
machines makes those machines more valuable. The constitutional rationalte] for
granting patent inventions in the United States is based on an incentive theory. We
want patents because of the free-rider problem and because patents are thought to
generate additional research and discovery. Even though computers do not care
about incentives, people who design computers do. Acknowledging computers as
inventors would reward effort upstream of the stage of invention, and it could also
promote disclosure and commercialisation of patentable subject matter.
Ryan Abbott, Inventive Machines: Rethinking Invention and Patentability, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANDDIGrfAL TRADE, supranote 15, at 113, 117-18; see alsoBailey, supranote 129,
at 171 (noting that the wrong type of legislation in this area "would damper [the firms']
enthusiasm to build intellectually creative machines whose work would automatically belong
to the public domain"). See generally Madeleine de Cock Buning, Artificial Intelligenceand
the Creative Industry: New Challengesfor the EU Paradigmfor Art and Technology by
Autonomous Creation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELuGENCE
511 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (discussing the complications autonomous
creation would pose to intellectual property law); Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and
PatentLaw, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELUGENCE, supra, at 489
(discussing the challenges that a thinking machine paradigm of invention would pose to U.S.
patent law).
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In sum, in the example concerning data produced by the
networked sensors in a smart car, complications will arise over who
should have control over the generated data.2 11 While this subpart has
shown that car owners, car manufacturers, and software manufacturers
all have strong claims to machine-generated data, one should not
overlook the possibility of a fourth, and highly attractive, option: the
release of these data into the public domain for all to use.2 12 As Drex
rightly noted, before deciding who owns what, we need to first
determine whether data should be owned in the first place. 2 13 Likewise,
Reto Hilty warned that asking the question "who 'owns' the data? ...
is already suggestive, because the primary question should be: can (or
should) data be 'owned' at all?" 214
Indeed, even if the answers to these questions are in the
affirmative, one does not always have to pick between these three
groups of players.
One could easily support co-ownership
arrangements among some or all of these players, 215 similar to what the
joint ownership of copyrighted works already allows.2 16 When such
211. Who has initial control may not matter as much if the transactions costs are low.
As the European Commission noted in its staff working document
According to the Coase theorem, the effects of an initial allocation of a good may be
limited if the good is freely tradable and the transaction costs are sufficiently small.
Depending on market forces/ bargaining position, it is therefore possible that rights
in data would be traded away to the actor(s) who would most benefit from its use.
Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 10, at 36 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless,
the discussion of the "tragedy of the anti-commons" in Part IILA suggests the existence of
holdups that prevent effective Coasian bargaining. See Kerber, supra note 5, at 997 ('The
problem of patent hold-ups for complex products (that need the simultaneous consent of many
patent holders) can also arise in regard to data. . . .).
212. See Hugenholtz, supranote 6, at 49 (noting four possibilities of data ownership:
"the automobile manufacturer; the car owner, the producer of the sensor equipment; or no one
at all").
213. As Drexl observed.
[TJhe question "Who owns the data?" is fundamentally misguided... [I]t skips the
prior question of whether there is a need to recognise any ownership. There is no
natural law that says that data as an asset, although it may have economic value, has
to be owned by anybody. Rather, recognition of any new right should, as is the case
in intellectual property in general, be considered a form of government regulation of
the market, which is in need of a particularjustification. In terms of data ownership,
which enables its owner to commercialise data, this justification needs to be an
economic one.
Drexl, supra note 17, at 260.
214. Hilty, supra note 144, at 88-89.
215. See id at 91 (raising the question whether the complex setting involving ownership
of data in a traffic app should "entail a kind of 'co-ownership").
216. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) ("The authors of a joint work are coowners of
copyright in the work.").
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co-ownership arrangements occur, new questions will arise over the
specific interests each player owns and what specific rights these
interests entail. Co-ownership arrangements will also likely create
more transaction costs than those involving sole ownership, 2 1 7 thereby

exacerbating the concern about creating a thicket of data producer's
rights.
3.

Duration of Protection

The third set of policy questions pertains to the duration of the
proposed data producer's right. The EU Database Directive offers
protection for about fifteen years that can be indefinitely extended
based on a "substantial change ... to the contents of a database,
including any substantial change resulting from the accumulation of
successive additions, deletions or alterations."218 The proposed, but
eventually abandoned, Database Treaty contained language offering
protection for an even longer duration-twenty-five years,
indefinitely extendable under similar conditions. 21 9 Based on these
prior developments, one may wonder whether the proposed data
producer's right should last for at least fifteen years.
Nevertheless, if the goal of this proposed right is to ensure the
opportunity for data producers and their collaborators to analyze the
generated data, the protection may not need to last for such a long
period of time. 2 0 For instance, the original proposal for the EU
Database Directive offered protection for only ten years.22 ' Indeed,
217. See Drexl, supranote 17, at 277 ("[I]f everybody contributing to the generation of
data in a value network is vested with ownership, this allocation could easily run the risk of
creating too many property rights, which would block efficient exploitation of big data in
particular.").
218. Council Directive 96/9, supra note 31, art. 10(3).
219. WIPO, supra note 44, art. 8(1) (Alternative A).
220. See Kerber, supra note 5, at 991 (noting the consensus in Germany and Europe
that the proposed data producer's right "should have a limited (and rather brief) duration of
protection, e.g., two or five years (perhaps with the possibility of extension), and should be
fully tradable"); Zech, supra note 173, at 469 ("A short term of protection would be
appropriate."); see also Drexl, supra note 17, at 278 ("In an environment where it is key to
capture the moment and where being late leads to wrong decisions, asking the question of how
long data should be protected will simply miss the needs of this economy.").
221. As Reichman and Samuelson observed, 'The first proposed draft E.C. Directive
... provided a ten-year period of lead time in which the database maker could recoup his or
her investment in a noncopyrightable electronic database while preventing copiers from
engaging in for-profit extraction or reutilization of the factual contents, in whole or in
substantial part." Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 81; see also NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 10 ("If [database] legislation with a fixed term of protection is
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Reichman and Uhlir have found the fifteen-year term under the EU
Database Directive "completely arbitrary." 2
Moreover, with the latest technology, data analysis can be done
fairly quickly, not to mention that much of this analysis has to be done
in real time." Even Zech, the leading proponent of the proposed data
producer's right, does not believe that the right should last for too
long. 24 Those European commentators in support of creating such a
right also seem to have reached a consensus that the duration of
protection could be as short as two to five years, with possible
extension.225
Finally, law and economics literature has shown that a market
head start could help innovators maintain a healthy competitive edge.226
Such a head start is similar to the limited competitive advantage the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provided to
sports leagues and their licensees in NBA v. Motomla, Inc." In that
case, the court created a "hot news" doctrine to allow the "producers"
of data through professional basketball games to retain limited control

adopted, an appropriate term of protection most likely should be substantially shorter than the
proposed 15-year term.").
222. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 61, at 817.
223. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERIM PROGREss REPORT, supra note 23,
at 2 ("[Dlata analysis is increasingly conducted in speeds approaching real time."); Drexl,
supra note 17, at 264 ("To keep up with the speed of this process is key in big data analytics
because the users of the results of such analyses will usually have to rely on real-time analyses
for decision-making in a constantly changing world.").
224. See Zech, supra note 173, at 469 (supporting a "short term of protection").
225. See Kerber, supra note 5, at 991 (noting that consensus in the German and
European discussion that the new data producer's right "should have a limited (and rather brief)
duration of protection, e.g., two or five years (perhaps with the possibility of extension)").
226. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 141 ("[D]atabase makers need a
market-preserving period of lead time during which unfair competition law may protect them
against 'cloning' or 'partial cloning,' that is, against the wholesale reproduction of all or a
substantial component of database contents."); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV.
L. REv. 281, 299-308 (1970) (arguing that the rewards created by a market head start may
provide incentives for authors to create).
227. See 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997) (prohibiting copying of "hot news" or timesensitive materials for competition purposes). As McManis observed:
The concept of providing artificial "lead-time" to minimize harm to a database
developer's market is reflected in the state common law "hot news"
misappropriation doctrine. Providing a limited term of such artificial lead time
allows database developers to recoup their investment of research and development
costs. If free riders can immediately and perfectly copy the database, the original
developer will be deprived of the opportunity to develop its market niche.
McManis, supra note 42, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
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over the in-progress transmission of these data.22 8 Notwithstanding the
benefits provided by a head start, how much of a head start data
producers should have largely depends on empirical analysis. The head
start they need may also depend on the state of technology, with
variations from sector to sector2 9

4.

Scope of Protection

The fourth set of policy questions regards the scope of protection.
This question is particularly important because a carefully defined
scope will help prevent or address the problem of "overlapping
rights"-that is, the existence of multiple, and often competing, layers
of rights covering the same subject matter.23 0 As Hugenholtz observed:
[A] film shot with a digital camera would qualify not only as a work
protected by copyright, but also as machine-generated (sensor) data
subject to a "data producer's right". Similarly, the aggregate stock
market data in a financial database would be protected both by the sui
generis right and the "data producer's right", since the data are recorded
231
automatically by the computerized stock exchange.
228. See NBA, 105 F.3d at 843 (holding that "a narrow 'hot-news' exception does
survive preemption [by the federal Copyright Act]" and that the "transmission of 'real-time'
NBA game scores and information tabulated from television and radio broadcasts of games in
progress does not constitute a misappropriation of 'hot news"); see also VICIORIA SMrri
EKSTRAND, HOT NEws IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE HOT NEWS

&

DocrINE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 159-201 (2015) (discussing the evolution
of hot news doctrine after NBA and its potential future in the age of big data).
229. As Drexl observed:
[A]llocation of data ownership is .. . an issue of considerable complexity because of
the particularities of the specific sectors. The interests of stakeholders regarding the
data collected by the sensors of a car, in which public authorities also have an
interest, so as to protect the environment or to increase driving safety, are likely to
be different than those in the case of health-related data derived from blood tests of
patients for which a patented diagnostic tool is used, which, taken together with
similar data from other labs, may help authorities around the globe to fight the spread
of infectious diseases.
Drexl, supranote 17, at 260; see also Commission Communication, supranote 2, at 17 (calling
for "[s]ector-specific experiments on standards"); MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 8
("mustrating differences among different sectors, if we compare the historical productivity of
sectors in the United States with the potential of these sectors to capture value from big data
(using an index that combines several quantitative metrics), we observe that patterns vary from
sector to sector. . . ").
230. For discussions of overlapping rights, see generally ESTELLE DERCLAYE
MATTrHAS LEISTNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OvERLAPS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2011);
OVERLAPPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supranote 48; Mark A. Lemley, Dealingwith

OverlappingCopyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997).
231. Hugenholtz, supranote 6, at 62.
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In its staff working document, the European Commission made a
distinction between semantic and syntactic information:
An ebook or a photographic image . . .has a semantic level which is the
expression of ideas or the presentation of objects or persons. Copyright
covers this level of information. The data file of such an ebook or image,
however, is merely a representation of signs encoding such information
usually requiring tools to present the information232
While the distinction between semantic and syntactic information
is thought-provoking-and could help address the much-needed divide
between copyright and the proposed daia producer's right-it is
unclear if lawmakers, policy makers, litigants, and law enforcement
personnel could easily make that distinction. As Hugenholtz
explained:
[Any copy of the film's digital file (the syntactic data) would by
necessity also reproduce the copyright protected work (the semantic
layer). Thus, the new data right could be invoked against any digital
copying (or streaming) of the digitized copyright work. For the same
reason, the new right would broadly overlap with the database right even
if its scope were confined to the syntactic layer. The phonographic right
discussed above illustrates this point. Whereas its subject matter, like the
proposed "data producer's right', is limited to the recorded signal (i.e.
syntactic audio data), its scope extends into the semantic realm.
Reproducing a CD recording of a musical performance will, by
necessity, result in the reproduction of the underlying musical work and
233
performance.

232. CommissionStafJ Working Document, supm note 10, at 34 n.156; see also Drexl,
supranote 17, at 263 ("IA] distinction can be made in terms of semiotics between the different
levels of information. For data protection, the distinction between the syntactic and the
semantic level is key." (footnote omitted)). As Zech explainedA distinction can be made on the level of meaning (semantic information),
such is the case with personal data defined as information relating to a person ....
Know-how is also considered to be semantic information, when defined by its

meanmng.
The term "data" can also be defined on the level of signs (syntactic

information), regardless of its meaning. As a legal object, sequences of "zeros" and
"ones" would be protected, either as a file or as a data stream. This distinction is
comparable to other syntactic representations of information, such as text (defined
by its symbols rather than meaning).
Zech, supranote 173, at 462-63 (footnote omitted).
233. Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 63-64; see also Scassa, supra note 1, at 4 ("[A]
photograph is a copyright-protected work; facial recognition software can extract data about
features froma photograph to create a faceprint that can be used in identifying the individual.").
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Consider, for example, the use of multiple camera drones to shoot
a telecast of a professional basketball game, similar to the one involved
in NBA.2 As a work consisting of sounds and images that are "being
made simultaneously with its transmission," the telecast will constitute
a copyrighted work,2 35 with the league or its designated licensing arm,
NBA Properties, Inc., being the work's copyright holder.2 36 Using the
definition provided by the European Commission, the telecast would
fall squarely within the category of semantic information. By contrast,
the statistics about the professional basketball players involved-such
as minutes played, points scored, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, and
turnovers-will be classified as syntactic information. As such, the
data generated by the camera drones will be protected by the proposed
data producer's right
Yet when all of the syntactic information has been inputted into a
computer that stores three-dimensional image files relating to
professional basketball players, similar to those found in the video
game NBA Live, the computer-generated telecast will bear a strong
resemblance to the copyrighted telecast, blurring the distinction
between semantic and syntactic information. In this instance, the
interplay of these two types of information will certainly worry the
NBA. If licensing arrangements are to be developed, the different types
of right involved will also raise considerable complications.
At some point, policy makers and commentators will have to
recognize the inability to use a separate binary to separate semantic and
syntactic information. Rather, all the information will fall on a
spectrum, in which syntactic information, as numbers and symbols,
could be combined to form meaning and be transformed into semantic
information. This spectrum is similar to the one involving unstructured,
semi-structured, and structured data-with semantic information on
the end with unstructured data and syntactic information on the other
end.237

234. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that
are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.").
236. See NBA, 105 F.3d at 841 (listing NBA Properties, Inc. as a plaintiff).
237. See HoLMs, supra note 1, at 5-6 (noting the oft-used taxonomy of structured,
semi-structured, and unstructured data). Semi-structured data are defined as "[dlata that do not
conform to fixed fields but contain tags and other markers to separate data elements."
MANYHCA Er AI., supra note 4, at 33. Examples of such data "include XML or HTML-tagged
text." Id.
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To complicate matters even further, there is no hard-and-fast rule
for determining whether it is more desirable to protect semantic or
syntactic information. Using the example of a pothole located by car
sensors, Drexl explained why "it would be better to avoid protecting
the semantic information the sensors of a car collect," even though
intellectual property rights generally protect this type of information. 3 8
As he observed:
[T]he question of whether the law should protect the semantic or the
syntactic information, or even only the integrity of the digital file, will
depend on the circumstances. This analysis would seem to argue for
context-specific regulation. Even a general regime on the protection of
industrial data would thus appear problematic since, in some instances,
protecting semantic information such as in the case oftrade secrets seems
the right approach, while protection of data collected through sensors in
the public sphere should probably not be extended to the meaning these
data are able to convey.239
5.

Limitations and Exceptions

The last set ofpolicy questions involves the creation of limitations
and exceptions-or, more positively, "the modalities of access." 2 As
Timo Minssen and Justin Pierce lamented: "Where data are not owned
or licensed, the user will need to rely on an exception to [intellectual
property right] infringement to use data. This has given rise to fierce
controversies between data 'owners,' data researchers, and entities that
provide enabling technologies, large research infrastructures, and
standardization platforms."2 4 1 Although data are often referred to as
"new oil,"24 2 one cannot ignore the fact that the latter is a finite

resource.24 3 Because of this crucial distinction, it could be quite
238. Drexl, supra note 17, at 263.
239. Id
240. JOSEF DREXL ET AL., MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION, DATA

OWNERsHIP AND AccEss To DATA 12 (2016), https://www.ipampg.defileadmin/ipmpg/
ahmen/positionspaper-data-eng-2016_08_16-defpdf (emphasis omitted).
content/selu
241. Minssen & Pierce, sqra note 177, at 311; see also REICHMANETAL., supra note
8, at 367 ("[N]ational and international intellectual property laws. . . remain hostile to the needs
of digitally integrated scientific research, and especially to publicly funded and public interest
research endeavors.").
242. See sources cited supranote 1.
243. See HOLME, supra note 1, at 20 ("[U]nlike oil, data appears not to be a finite
resource."); Scassa, supranote 1, at 1 ("[M]any are quick to point out that data are an infinitely
renewable resource."); Lauren Henry Scholz, Big DataIs Not Big Oil: The Role ofAnalogy in
the Law ofNew Technologies (Fia. State Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Paper No. 895,
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252543 (challenging the data-as-oil analogy); see also ORG.
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beneficial for data to be used simultaneously by multiple parties or
reused by others after their earlier use.2
One potential exception to the data producer's right that would
facilitate data use and reuse is the exception for text and data mining
(TDM). A similar exception is currently being explored as part of the
copyright law reform in Australia, 2 45 the European Ujnion,2 " Singapore,24 7

and other parts of the world. 24 In the United Kingdom, such an
exception can now be found in section 29A of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988, which allows "[t]he making of a copy
of a work by a person who has lawful access to the work" in order to
"carry out a computational analysis of anything recorded in the work
for the sole purpose of research for a non-commercial purpose."24 9
FOR EcoN. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 4, at 179-80 (discussing data as a non-rivarous
good); REcHmAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 435 (noting that publicly funded research data and

information "gains in value from broad dissemination and . .. is reusable").
244. See Scassa, srupra note 1, at 1 ("Trhe same data are . .. capable of being used by
multiple actors and for multiple purposes.").
245. See Ausm. LAw REFORM COMM'N, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGrrAL EcoNoMY:
FINAL REPORT

249,260-66 (2013) (discussing TDM).

246. See Drexl, supra note 17, at 276 (noting the "proposal of the Commission to
introduce an unwaivable exception to copyright protection for carrying out text and data
mining for the purpose of scientific research").
247. See MINISTRY OF LAW, PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO
SINGAPORE'S COPYRIGHT REGIME 34-35 (2016) (seeking consultation for Proposal 9 on TDM).
248. See Christophe Geiger et al, Crafing a Text and Data Afuning Exceptionfor
MachineLearningandBigDatain theDigitalSingleMar*et, in INTELECIUALPROPERTY AND
DIGITAL TRADE, supranote 15, at 95, 97 ("Text and data mining ... serves as an essential tool
to navigate the endless sea of online information in search of this invaluable treasure that big
data might hold for the European economy."); Xavier Seuba et al., Introduction to
INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE, supra note 15, at 9, 15 ('Text and data mining
... has been a fundamental technique to make machine leaming--and artificial intelligence
autonomous decision-making and creativity-possible by copying or crawling massive
datasets."). See generally Matthew Sag, The New Legal Landrcapefor Text Mining and
Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.SA (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the
changing U.S. legal landscape for TDM research).
249. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 29A(1) (Eng.). As Christophe
Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, and Oleksandr Bulayenko explained, this exception can help avoid
copyright infringement in many situations:
[A]ny reproductions resulting in the creation of a copy of a protected work along the
chain of TDM activities might trigger copyright infringement. In this respect, preprocessing to standardize materials into machine-readable formats might trigger
infringement of the right of reproduction. Likewise, the uploading of the preprocessed material on a platform-which might or might not occur, depending on
whether the TDM technique makes use of TDM software crawling data to be
analysed directly from the source-might also violate the right of reproduction.
Mining (the stage of the TDM process where data are finally extracted) can also
infringe upon the right of reproduction, depending on the mining software deployed
and the character of the extraction. For example, there are extraction techniques that
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Other exceptions that could be of great public benefit are those
2 52
1
2
2 50
concerning government access, scientific resemh S data portablity,
would reproduce parts of the work so minimal as to fall below the threshold of
copyright infringement.
Again, TDM might involve the reproduction, translation, adaptation, arrangement,
and any other alteration of a database protected by copyright, which means the
original selection and arrangement of the database's content For example, preprocessing for extraction might cleanse from a database portions and data that are
irrelevant for data analysis. In this respect, pre-processing might violate both the
right of reproduction and the right to make adaptations and arrangements.
Geiger et al., supra note 248, at 98-99 (footnotes omitted).
250. See Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 10, at 36 ("[P]ublic sector
bodies may ... have a legitimate interest in obtaining access to certain data. This has relevance
for the provision of statistical information, urban planning, environmental protection, civil
protection, etc. In most situations, public sector bodies would need aggregate information
only."); KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 140, at 223-24 (discussing the use of data by city
authorities to monitor and manage traffic); Drexl, supra note 17, at 262 ("[The geographical
location of the car at a given moment can ... inform the public authorities about the volume
of use and trafic conditions of roads at a given time."); Farkas, supranote 10, at 6 (noting that
the data communicated by networked cars "can be used to ... improve road conditions ... and
to plan road reconstructions"); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 43, at 116-17 ("Much of
the data that fuels some scientific disciplines is collected by governments to foster public safety
(for example, providing timely warnings of potential disasters, such as floods, tornadoes and
the like)."). As Drexl explained[A]ccess to data is justifiable where public entities seek access for the fulfilment of
tasks in the public interest In the light of the large benefits deriving from big data
analytics, which could help optimise public policies and decisions of the state in
many regards, this sub-category for which access regimes could be implemented
seems most important Such regimes could be implemented at the different levels
of government through sector-specific regulation. Sector-specific regulation
appears as the road to take, since the security interests of the state will most likely
need different rules than the prevention of infectious diseases, the protection of the
environment or the functioning of smart cities or traffic control systems.
Drexl, supranote 17, at 289 (footnote omitted).
251. See Commission Staf Working Docrnent,supra note 10, at 36 ("[I]n line with the
Commission's policy on open science and open access, an exception ensuring access to
relevant privately-held data could be considered for scientists performing research entirely or
predominantly funded by public resources.").
252. See Commission Communication,supra note 2, at 15 (discussing the portability of
nonpersonal data); Commission Staff Working Docrnent, supra note 10, at 46-49 (same);
Drexl, supra note 17, at 286 ("Since this rule on data portability constitutes a most suitable
form of pro-competitive regulation, there is no reason why the right to data portability should
be limited to personal data."); Kerber, supra note 5, at 997 ("[Slupporting portability,
interoperability and standardization in regard to data is seen as pivotal policy measures for
improving the govemance of data in the digital economy."); see also Council Regulation
2016/679, supra note 26, art. 20 (introducing the right to data portability). Nevertheless, the
Commission noted in its communication document
[R]egarding non-personal data, there are at present no obligations to guarantee even
a minimum level of data portability, even for widely used online services such as
cloud hosting providers. This is partly because the requirements for implementing
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platform interoperability,2 3 the nonprotection of public sector
information,2 54 and the need to address anticompetitive concerns. 2 55
To promote competition, the European Commission suggested
the use of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) licenses
to facilitate the utilization and dissemination of machine-generated
data 25 6 As the Commission stated in its communication document,
"[F]ramework potentially based on certain key principles, such as
[FRAND] terms, could be developed for data holders ... to provide

data portability can be technically demanding and costly, as different providers of
the same services may store data differently.
Commission Communication,supranote 2, at 15.
253. See Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 16 (discussing the
interoperability of nonpersonal data); MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supranote 1, at 183
("We should enable data transactions, such as through licensing and interoperability."); Drexl,
supra note 17, at 292 ("The functioning of the data economy will also depend on the
interoperability of digital formats and the tools of data collecting and processing"). See
generally Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 NYU L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (providing an excellent discussion of data standardization).
254. See CommissionStaff Working Document, supra note 10, at 22 (subjecting the reuse of data held by the public sector to rules under the Directive 2003/98/EC); ORG. FOREcoN.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4, at 403-38 (examining the benefits and challenges of
opening access to data from the public sector); Drexl, supra note 17, at 262 ("[S]tates started
to realise that it is becoming increasingly important to grant private businesses access to
publicly held data... for commercial re-use in order to promote new commercial information
services."); Scassa, supra note 1, at 2-3 ("[A]ny data ownership rights must similarly include
exceptions that are appropriate for the public interest"); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supranote 69, at 100 ("[Pjrotection should not be extended to database collected or maintained
by the government" (emphasis omitted)); Ruth L. Okediji, Government as Owner of
IntellectualProperty? ConsiderationsforPublic Welfare in the Era ofBig Data, 18 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 356-60 (2016) (advancing three approaches to "creatively address[] the
terms of access to knowledge goods created from big data").
255. For discussions of the interplay of the proposed data producer's right and
competition law, see generally MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CuIER, supra note 1, at 182-84;
Drexl, supra note 17, at 280-85; Timo Minssen & Jens Schovsbo, BigData in the Health and
Life Sciences: What Are the Challengesfor EuropeanCompetition Law and Where Can They
Be Found?, in INTELLECruAL PROPERTY AND DIGrrAL TRADE, supra note 15, at 121.
256. See Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 13; see also Commission Staff
Working Document, supra note 10, at 39 ("The degree of openness can range from full
openness (the licensor is required to allow free access to data) to a set of intermediate options.
Licensing conditions should be fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory between different
licensees."). As Wolfgang Kerber observed:
The problem of patent hold-ups for complex products (that need the simultaneous
consent of many patent holders) can .. . arise in regard to data, if the provider of a
certain product or service needs access to complementary data. It might then be
necessary to consider access solutions similar to standard-essential patents (with
FRAND-conditions).
Kerber, supranote 5, at 997.
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Finally, to ensure the effectiveness and vitality of these limitations
and exceptions, some jurisdictions may consider the adoption of
"contract override" legislation to prohibit the use of private contracts
to circumvent the safeguards provided by these limitations and
exceptions. 25 8 In August 2014, the United Kingdom adopted the
Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody)
Regulations 2014,259 Which rendered unenforceable contractual terms
that purport to prevent or restrict the newly created permitted acts, such
as those relating to quotation, caricature, parody, and pastiche. 260 To
the extent that the limitations and exceptions are highly beneficial to
the public, a contract override would prevent parties with weak
bargaining positions from being forced to contract away those
important flexibilities and safeguards."'
B.

Exogenous Complications

The previous subpart focused on the proposed data producer's
right as a new form of protection within the intellectual property system.
This subpart turns to four related areas in which the proposed right
would create additional complications. The first set of complications
is still within the intellectual property system, while the other three sets
257. Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 13.
258. See Drexl, supra note 17, at 276 ("Access can also be guaranteed by special
legislation on access that takes precedence over contractual restrictions."); id at 291 ("In
principle, the legislature could ... promote access through un-waivable exceptions and
limitation as part of a comprehensive legislation of data ownership."); see also J.H. Reichman
& Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contractwith Public Good Uses ofInformation, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 929-38
(1999) (advancing a "doctrine of public-interest unconscionability"). For discussions of
contractual override or issues relating to "contracting out," see generally AUSTL. LAW REFORM
COMM'N, COPYRIGHT AND THE DiGrTAL EcoNoMY: DiscussioN PAPER 353-77 (2013); AuSTL.
LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 245, at 435-57; REICHMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 349-50.
259. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regulations
2014, SI 2014/2356 (Eng.).
260. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30A(2) (Eng.) ("To the
extent that a term of a contract purports to prevent or restrict the doing of any act which, by
virtue of this section, would not infringe copyright, that term is unenforceable").
261. See Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 12 ("The unequal bargaining
power of companies and private individuals should be taken into account Lock-in situations,
especially for [small and medium-sized enterprises] and startups and private individuals,
should be avoided."). Notably, article 15 of the EU Database Directive states that "[a]ny
contractual provision contrary to Articles 6(1) and 8 shall be null and void." Council Directive
96/9, supra note 31, art. 15. Both provisions cover the rights and obligations of lawful users.
See id. arts. 6(1), 8.
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of complications lie outside. A deeper understanding of these four sets
of complications will be highly significant in the development of a
sound governance regime to address the emerging needs of our fastgrowing data-driven economy.
1.

Intellectual Property

The first set of complications concerns the protection of other
forms of intellectual property rights. As noted earlier, the proposed data
producer's right could generate the problem of "overlapping rights." 262
For example, the new protection for machine-generated data could
create complications with the preexisting protection for not only
databases but also data themselves. While the EU Database Directive
continues to use copyright to protect databases that constitute
intellectual creations,26 3 it also offers sui generisprotection to databases
that are ineligible for copyright protection. 2 " The proposed data
producer's right would add a new layer of protection for
uncopyrightable machine-generated data to these two layers of rights
even when the investments involved have been made for "the creation
as
of materials which make up the contents of a database,"

262. See discussionsupraPart IVA4.
263. See Council Directive 96/9, supranote 31, art. 3(1) ("[D]atabases which, by reason
of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual
creation shall be protected as such by copyright.").
264. See id arts. 7-11 (providing coverage for the sui generisdatabase right).
265. Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004
E.C.R. 1-10461. For discussions of this case, see generally Mark J. Davison & P. Bemt
Hugenholtz, Football Frtures, Horseraces and Spin-Ofs: The ECJ Domesticates the
DatabaseRight, 27 EUR. NTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2005); Leistner, supra note 99, at 434-46.
As Drexl explained.
[A] sui generis database right only subsists if "there has been qualitatively and/or
quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verzfacation or
presentationof the contents". The [Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)]
has interpreted these requirements in a very restrictive way. It clarified that the
investment has "to refer to the resources used to seek out existing independent
materials and collect them in the database, and not to the resources used for the
creation as such of independent material[s]." The CJEU explained this with the
objective of the Directive to create incentives for the making of databases and not
for the creation of the data that goes into the database. Hence, a distinction is to be
made between the "creation" of the materials contained in the database and the
"obtaining" of these materials. This leads to the conclusion that the creation of smart
products with sensors that collect data should not be considered for the assessment
of whether the investment in the database was "substantial". The same applies to
big data analyses. These may well require substantial investment. However, such
analyses only lead to the creation of new data in the form of knowledge, which may
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opposed to the "obtaining, verification or presentation of the[se]
contents." 266
If one focuses on data instead, the proposed data producer's right
might create further complications with preexisting laws covering trade
secrets2 67 and data exclusivities.2
ter all, these alternative forms of
intellectual property rights have already been used to protect data.
Indeed, the European Commission's staff working document suggests
that the proposed data producer's right could take the form of a
defensive right? Such a right would likely be quite similar to the
protection currently offered under trade secrecy or unfair competition
law.270

When overlaps arise, the proposed right could lead to regime
clashes and overprotection. 2 7 1 Such clashes and overlaps, in turn,
would undermine the protection offered in preexisting intellectual
property regimes, especially in relation to their limitations,
safeguards, and flexibilities.27 2 If these overlaps are to be avoided,
commentators have suggested the need for preemption tools. 273 As
then be included in databases. For the protection of these databases, the investment
in the big data analyses is not to be taken into account.
Drexl, supra note 17, at 268 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Council Directive 96/9, supra note
31, art. 7(1); Case C-203/02, British Horseracing, 2004 E.C.R. 1-10461); see also Kerber,
supra note 5, at 991 ("EU database protection only protects the investment made into the
collection of already existing data in a database but not the investment made into the production
of data itself").
266. Council Directive 96/9, supranote 31, art. 7(1).
267. See Zech, supra note 173, at 465 (discussing data as protected secrets).
268. See Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities in the Age of Big Data, Biologics, and
Plurilaterals,6 TEx. A&M L. REv. ARGUENDO 22, 32-33 (2018) (discussing the growing
importance of data exclusivity protection with the increasing use of big data analytics and the
fast-paced development of biologics and personalized medicines); see also HOLMES, supra
note 1, at 68-69 (discussing the use of sensor data in the health context, such as those relating
to magnetic resonance imaging scans and wearable devices).
269. See Commission Staf WorkingDocument,supra note 10, at 33-34 (conceiving the
data producer right "as a set of purely defensive rights" (emphasis omitted)).
270. See Hilty, supra note 144, at 89 (noting that the "defensive rights" approach is
comparable to the possession of know-how and analogizing the underlying legal protection to
trade secrets).
271. See DERCIAYE & LEISrNER, supra note 230, at 318 ("[C]umulation of rights
presents two problems: regime clashes and overprotection.").
272. See Hugenholtz, supra note.6, at 62-63 ("[B]oth copyright and the database right
in the EU presently allow users to copy or extract data from databases for non-commercial
research purposes. Unless, the 'data producer's right' was to replicate all relevant existing
exceptions in the field ofcopyright, neighboring rights and the database right, it would undercut
these essential user freedoms.").
273. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (providing for federal preemption of equivalent state
claims); see also PeterK. Yu, Note, FictionalPersonaTest. CopyrightPreemption in Hwnan
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Hugenholtz observed, "The only way to prevent the data right from
becoming an all-encompassing 'super-[intellectual property] right'
would be to categorically exclude all data that (possibly) represent
subject matter protected under traditional [intellectual property]
regimes: not only copyright, the database right and neighboring rights,
but also design right and perhaps patent law." 274
2.

Privacy

The second area that the proposed data producer's right may spill
into pertains to the protection of personal data, which is in the field of
privacy or data protection law. With the implementation of the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPRY7 in May 2018, and the
creation of considerable ramifications for individuals and businesses in
the European Union and abroad, the complications of privacy law have
caught the attention of policy makers, commentators, private
businesses, and individuals.
To be sure, the GDPR and other privacy laws cover personal data,
while the proposed data producer's right focuses on nonpersonal,
anonymized machine-generated data. 276 NeVertieless, the increased
sophistication of data analytics has raised questions about the
effectiveness of data anonymization. A growing volume of research
has already shown the possibility of reconstructing seemingly
277
anonymized data to reveal the identity of data subjects.

Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDozo L. REv. 355, 367-75 (1998) (discussing preemption of
state claims by federal copyright law).
274. Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 64.
275. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 26.
276. As the European Commission declared in its communication document:
Where personal data are concerned, the individual will retain his right to withdraw
his [or her] consent at any time after authorising the use. Personal data would need
to be rendered anonymous in such a manner that the individual is not or no longer
identifiable, before its further use may be authorised by the other party. Indeed, the
GDPR continues to apply to any personal data (whether machine generated or
otherwise) until that data has been anonymised.
Commission Communication, supra note 2, at 13.
277. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUIGER, supra note 1, at 154 ("[B]ig data, with its
increase in the quantity and variety of information, facilitates re-identification."); Cate, supra
note 15, at 9 ([I]n a world of big data ... with sufficient, interconnected data, even deidentified or anonymized data may be rendered personally identifiable."); Ohm & Peppet,
supra note 15, at 45 ("[Bjecause of big data advances in data analytics, we may soon learn that
'everything reveals everything."); Peppet, supra note 12, at 118-23 (discussing how sensor
fusion and big data analytics may mean that everything reveals everything).
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Moreover, seemingly anonymized data may be highly personal.
Consider, for instance, the data about car locations appearing on
navigation apps. As Hilty explained:
The colour green [on these apps] is used for flowing traffic, orange for
slow-moving traffic, and red to signal a traffic jam. This information is
not collected based on hundreds of helicopters or drones flying over the
country, sending pictures to traffic control centres. Instead, this
information is generated by correlative movements of the mobile
telephones of the car drivers passing through the same positions; Apple,
Android, and all other applications are based on similar technologies. It
goes without saying that individual drivers could be identified, their data
could for instance be connected with data produced by the car itsel or
advertisements could be sent to them, for example for nearby restaurants
when there is a traffic jamV8
In sum, given the potential, and arguably inevitable, overlap
between personal and nonpersonal data, policy makers should develop
a deeper understanding of the interplay between the protection for
personal or personally identifying data and the protection for
nonpersonal, anonymized data that the proposed data producer's right
seeks to offer. If policy makers are unsure how to protect the former,
they should pause to think more deeply about the implications of the
proposed data producer's right for privacy protection.
3.

Trade

The third area that the proposed data producer's right may spill
into relates to the ongoing discussion of digital trade and cross-border
data flows at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other
international and regional fora. 9 Many of the bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements that are under negotiation or that have
recently been completed also include dedicated chapters to promote the
free movement of data.2" To some extent, the electronic commerce
chapters included in these agreements "represent ... a distinct attempt
278. Hilty, supra note 144, at 91.
279. See Mira Burri, The GovernanceofData andData Flows in TradeAgreements:
The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 77-99 (2017) (discussing the
digital trade issues at the WTO); see also Christopher Kuner, Regulation of TransborderData
Flows Under DataProtectionandPrivacyLaw: Past,PresentandFuture(Org. for Econ. CoOperation & Dev., OECD Digital Economy Paper No. 187,201 1) htt/www.oecd-ilibrazy.org/
sciened-technologyhegulationef-transbonfer-data-flows-under-data-prtection-and-privacylaw_5kgs2fk315f-en.
280. See Burri,supranote 279, at 99-125 (discussing developments relating to U.S. free
trade agreements and the TPP).
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to compensate for the lack of progress in the WTO and remedy the
ensuing uncertainties." 28 1

Included in the TPP electronic commerce chapter are a wide
variety of issues, such as customs duties, nondiscriminatory treatment
of digital products, domestic electronic transactions, electronic
authentication and signatures, online consumer protection, personal
information protection, paperless trading, access to and use of the
Internet for electronic commerce, cross-border transfer of information
by electronic means, Internet interconnection charge sharing, location
of computing facilities, unsolicited commercial electronic messages,
cooperation on cybersecurity matters, and the source code of computer
software. 282
As Mira Burri explained, these issues emerge in international and
regional fora in part because "data needs to cross borders for a thriving
data economy; [but] at the same time, states do exercise jurisdiction
within their borders as a rule of public international law."2 83 In her view,
trade rules affect data in three ways:
(i) . . . they regulate the cross-border flow of data by regulating trade in
goods and services as well as the protection of intellectual property;
(ii) ...

they may install certain beyond-the-border rules that demand

changes in domestic regulation-for example, with regard to
intermediaries' liability; and (iii) ... trade law can limit the policy space
that regulators have at home. 284

Among the restrictions commentators have identified in this area are
"requirements for data localisation, mandates for local processing of
data... requiring government approval for data transfers," as well as
measures "that are discriminatory in their treatment of foreign data
suppliers."2 85
In the trade arena, a widely scrutinized development concerns the
negotiation of the TPP electronic commerce chapter.286 Considered by
many as the most comprehensive electronic commerce chapter
among all bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements,2 87
281. Id at 101.
282. TPP Agreement, supranote 169, ch. 14.
283. Burri, supranote 279, at 68.
284. Id
285. Maskus, supranote 129, at 26.
286. TPP Agreement, supranote 169, ch. 14.
287. See Burri, supra note 279, at 113 ("The TPP chapter on e-commerce is clearly the
most comprehensive of all [free trade agreements] so far. It comprises eighteen articles and
includes new features that in effect signal an expansion of the U.S. template for digital trade."

(footnote omitted)).
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this chapter has now been incorporated as part of the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).288
Covering the "Cross-Border Transfer of Information by Electronic
Means," article 14.11 of the CPTPP specifically provides: "Each Party
shall allow the cross-border transfer of information by electronic means,
including personal information, when this activity is for the conduct of
the business of a covered person."2 89
Titled "Location of Computing Facilities," article 14.13 further
provides signatory parties with discretion to "its own regulatory
requirements regarding the use of computing facilities, including
requirements that seek to ensure the security and confidentiality of
communications." 2 9 Nevertheless, the CPTPP electronic commerce
chapter prohibits the application of regulatory measures "in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade."2 91
4.

Investment

The final area that the proposed data producer's right may spill
into involves the ongoing effort to address intellectual property
disputes via the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 92 As I
noted in an earlier article, the growing use of this mechanism has
sparked a transformation similar to what we experienced three
288. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8,
2018, http//www.mfat.vnen/radefee-tbut-not-in-force/cptpp/comprensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-tans-pacific-partnershiptext; see also Peter K Yu, Thinking About the rans-Pacific PartnershW (anda MegaRegional Agreement on Life Support), 20 SMU Scl. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 104-06 (2017)
(discussing the CPTPP); CPTPPvs TPP, N. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, https-//
www.mft.govt.nz/eade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-uder-negotiation/cptpp-2/tppand-cptpp-the-differencesexplained/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (explaining the differences
between the TPP and the CPTPP).
289. TPP Agreement, supranote 169, art. 14.11.2.
290. Id art. 14.13.1.
291. Id art. 14.13.3(a).
292. For the Author's discussions of investor-state dispute settlement, see generally
Peter K. Yu, ConceptualandInstitutionalImprovements to Investor-StateDisputeSettlement,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON NELECIUAL PROPERTY AND INVESTMENT LAW (Christophe
Geiger ed., forthcoming 2019); Peter K Yu, CrosfertilizingISDS with TRIPS, 49 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 321 (2017); Peter K Yu, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Drans-Pacfc
Partnership,in INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY AND THE JuDIcIARY 463 (Christophe Geiger et al.
eds., 2018); Peter K Yu, The Investment-RelatedAspects ofIntellectual PropertyRights, 66
AM. U. L. REv. 829 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, Investment-Related Aspects]; Peter K Yu, The
Pathways of Multinational Intellectual Property Dispute Settlement, in INTELLECrUAL
PROPERTY AS PROPERTY: OF PHARMAcEurICAis, TOBACCO, COMMODmES AND OTHER

MATTERS (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., forthcoming 2019).

TULANE LAW REVIEW

924

[Vol. 93:859

decades ago when the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights2 3 (TRIPS Agreement) was established to
marry intellectual property to trade. 294
At the time of writing, there is no indication that data producers
have plans to follow the leads of Philip Morris, 295 Eli Lilly,2 96 and
the Japanese Bridgestone Group 297 in using investor-state dispute
settlement to protect machine-generated data. Nevertheless, because
"most international investment agreements define 'investment' broadly
to cover all forms of 'intellectual property rights,"' 298 these relevant
agreements will cover the proposed data producer's right once that
right has been created.

293. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
294. As I noted in an earlier article:
[The TRIPS Agreement] not only transformed the intemational intellectual property
landscape but also necessitated a revision-and for many countries, a complete
overhaul-of the domestic intellectual property system. It is therefore no surprise
that some leading commentators have described the TRIPS Agreement as a "sea
change" or "tectonic shift' in international intellectual property law and policy.
Today, we are at a similar crossroads. Through bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade and investment agreements, new norms are being developed to
address the investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights. Even more
importantly, these norms will strengthen the ability of private investors, such as
intellectual property rights holders, to sue foreign governments without the support
of their home governments. One therefore cannot help but wonder whether we are
now approaching yet another "sea change" or "tectonic shift' in international
intellectual property law and policy.
Yu, Investment-RelatedAspects, supranote 292, at 831 (footnotes omitted).

295. Philip Morris Brands Shrl v. Oriental Republic ofUnL, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Award (July 8, 2016) (using the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in the bilateral
agreement between Switzerland and Uruguay to challenge tobacco control measures in
Uruguay); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015) (using the investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism in the bilateral agreement between Australia and Hong Kong to
challenge tobacco control measures in Australia).
296. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award (Mar.
16, 2017) (utilizing Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement to seek
compensation for the Canadian courts' invalidation of its patents on two hyperactivity drugs).
297. Bridgestone Licensing Servs., Inc. v. Republic of Pan., ICSID Case No.
ARB/16/34, Request for Arbitration (Oct. 7, 2016) (using the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism in the bilateral agreement between Panama and the United States to challenge the
damage award granted by the Supreme Court of Panama in relation to the investor's action in
opposing a trademark registration).
298.

Yu, Investment-RelatedAspects, supranote 292, at 861. But see TPP Agreement,

supranote 169, art. 18.1 (defining "intellectual property" to cover "all categories of intellectual
property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement").
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In fact, if the proposed right is to be created using the property
model, data producers will have rather compelling arguments about
their ability to invoke the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism to address disputes involving this new right. After all, a
key attraction of this mechanism is to offer "[p]rotection against
uncompensated expropriation ofproperty." 2 9 As the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative declared in its fact sheet on investor-state dispute
settlement, the mechanism provides "[a]n assurance that the property
of investors will not be seized by the government without the payment
ofjust compensation."'
When disputes over ownership ofmachine-generated data are tied
to the right to private property in human rights law, property-based
arguments will also find support in intemational and regional human
rights instruments.0' InAnheuser-BaschInc. v. Portugal,o2 the European
Court of Human Rights extended the protection of "the peaceful
enjoyment of ... possessions" in Protocol No. 1 to the European
Convention of Human Rights... to cover both registered trademarks
and trademark applications of a multinational corporation. The right to
property provision in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union also explicitly covers intellectual property.3

299. Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 292, at 866 n.163 (quoting FACT
SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (mar.
11, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/rss-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor
-state-dispute-settlement-isds [https//web.archive.org/web/20181215121836/https://ustr.gov/
about-us/policy-offices/proffice/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlementisdsD. For discussions ofthe increasing focus on the assetization, or investment-related aspects,
of intellectual property rights, see generally OLE-ANDREAS ROGNSTAD, PROPERTY ASPECTS OF
INRELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68-71, 126-99 (2018); Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From
Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How InternationalLaw Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual
Property,36 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 557 (2015); Yu, Investment-RelatedAspects, supranote 292.
300. Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 292, at 866 n.163 (quoting FACT
SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra note 299).
301. See Yu, supra note 197, at 85-95 (discussing the growing use of the right to
property to provide an alternative human rights basis for intellectual property rights and
addressing the related concerns).
302. App. No. 73049/01,45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36(2007).
303. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952,213 U.N.T.S. 262 ("Every natural or legal person
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and
by the general principles of international law.").
304. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 17(2), 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1, 12 ("Intellectual property shall be protected.").
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Summary

The proposal for a new data producer's right would have
complications both within and outside the area of machine-generated
data. While the intellectual property system has been rapidly
expanding, this Part has shown how the proposed right would create
complications that deserve serious policy and academic attention.
Given that neither the past lessons nor the present needs support the
proposed data producer's right, the legal and policy challenges this
proposal would generate suggest that we should not hastily introduce
this proposal without undertaking more extensive study and careful
impact assessment Introducing a data producer's right could not only
harm individuals and businesses but could also affect the rights
protected in other areas of intellectual property law as well as in the
areas of privacy, trade, and investment
V.

PRELIMINARY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This Article has shown that neither past lessons nor present needs
support the proposed data producer's right.30 s Worse still, this proposal
would raise complications with the future development of a sound and
holistic data governance regime." The logical conclusion, therefore,
is to reject the proposal, similar to how Congress rejected the numerous
proposals for sui generis database protection in the late 1990s and early
2000s.o' This Article does not stop there, however. It goes further to
advance four courses of action that could be instrumental in developing
a holistic and effective data governance regime. Such a regime is
particularly important considering the current fragmentary legal and
regulatory environment in this area.0
First, and most obviously, policy makers should reject the
introduction of a data producer's right for nonpersonal, anonymized
machine-generated data, similar to the one advanced by the European
Commission." If enough empirical evidence suggests that some data
305. See discussion supra Parts I-Ill.
306. See discussion supra Part IV.
307. See discussion supra Part IIA
308. See M. Lynne Markus, Obstacles on the Road to Corporate Data Responsibility,
in BIG DATA Is NOT A MoNoiTH, supra note 7, at 143, 156 ("[T]he legal and regulatory
environment of data protection is fragmented, creating a patchwork of rules with overlaps,

conflicts, and gaps.").
309. See Commission Counnication, supra note 2, at 13 (suggesting the creation of a

new data producer's right as a possibility for addressing the issue of access to machinegenerated data).
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producer's right could be, on balance, socially expedient, policy
makers should carefully study this evidence to explore whether a
limited right is justified-and if so, in what form, in which sector(s),
and under what conditions. While there is at present insufficient
evidence to support such a limited right, especially one under the
property model, this Article does not take the position that such a right
can never be justified in any form, in any sector, or under any condition.
Whether this right can be justified depends on empirical evidence and
impact assessment. The more narrowly the right is defined, the better
policy makers will be at scrutinizing the need for such a right.
Second, as Part IVB has shown, data governance covers many
different areas of law and policy. While data governance in the areas
of privacy and intellectual property has been widely studied, it is
increasingly important to examine data protection in the areas of both
trade and investment-areas that are understudied in legal literature. 10
Although Part IVB does not further explore the interplay of the
proposed data producer's right and competition law'"-a critical
area relating to data governancesI 2-commentators have advanced
notable work in this area."' If policy makers are to develop a sound
and holistic data governance regime, they will have to break out of their
conceptual silos to undertake a holistic examination of issues relating
to data governance. Piecemeal examinations, such as those relating to

&

310. See Burri, supra note 279, at 76 ("[M]uch of the debate within and outside the
WTO, as well as the literature devoted to digital trade, have focused on trade in services and
its regulation.").
311. Part IV.B focuses on privacy, trade, and investment, in part because rights in
machine-generated data could emerge in these areas. Competition law, by contrast, serves
mostly as a countervailing regime. See Drexl, supra note 17, at 261 (noting the "reliance on
competition law as a countervailing legal regime").
312. As Minssen and Pierce observed.
While there are issues to be resolved between Big Data and [intellectual property
rights], there is a growing awareness of the importance of data and specifically Big
Data by market authorities. Antitrust agencies, those in the United States and
competition agencies in Europe, are taking note of Big Data, and there is an
increasing trend to examine closely the collection, use, and access of Big Data for
anticompetitive effects.
Minssen & Pierce, supra note 177, at 320; see also Zech, supra note 173, at 461 (noting that
competition law is an "important area[] of law for a data economy").
313. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUIGER, supra note 1, at 182-84 (discussing the use
of competition law to govern the data barons); Drexl, supra note 17, at 280-85 (discussing the
application of EU competition law to address refisals to grant access to data); Minssen
Schovsbo, supra note 255 (discussing the challenges big data in health and life sciences have
posed to EU competition law).
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the data producer's right in the intellectual property context, are
unlikely to suffice.
Third, if policy makers do take the position that machinegenerated data should not be protected, they need to actively push for
prohibitive treaty language at the global level. International intellectual
property agreements are filled with language prohibiting the
protection of raw data. Article 9.2 of the TRIPS Agreement makes
clear that copyright protection shall not extend to "ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts."3 14 Article 10.2 further
stipulates that the protection of compilations of data or other material
"shall not extend to the data or material itself."" Likewise, the WIPO
Copyright Treaty includes a specific provision on databases:
Compilations of data or other material, in any form, which by reason of
the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual
creations, are protected as such. This protection does not extend to the
data or the material itself and is without prejudice to any copyright
subsisting in the data or material contained in the compilation.
As Part IV.B.3 has shown, the electronic commerce chapters in recent
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements have focused
primarily on issues such as protection of personal information, 17 crossborder transfer of information by electronic meansM and location of
computing facilities.3 19 It is increasingly necessary that policy makers
more seriously explore whether these chapters should also include
language concerning protection or nonprotection of machine-generated
data.
Finally, policy makers and commentators should closely study the
five sets of policy questions identified in Part I.A. Although these
questions are difficult to answer, efforts to engage with these questions
could be highly valuable. Such engagement could help foster academic
debate, promote future legal and policy development, and advance
international norm-setting efforts. Indeed, given the similarities
between the criticisms of sui generis database protection in the 1990s
and early 2000s and today's criticisms of the EU proposal for a data
314. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 293, art. 9.2.
315. Id art. 10.2.
316. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 51, art. 5 (capitalization omitted).
317. See TPP Agreement, supra note 169, art. 14.8 (stipulating provisions regarding
personal information protection).
318. See id art. 14.11 (stipulating provisions regarding cross-border transfer of data and
other information by electronic means).
319. See id art 14.13 (stipulating provisions regarding location of computing facilities).
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producer's right, it would not be too far-fetched to suggest that the
proposal for property rights in data will return in yet another form if the
European Commission's proposal is rejected or fades away. However,
if that proposal succeeds and slowly emerges on this side of the Atlantic,
there is even more reason for policy makers and commentators to
actively engage with those five sets of policy questions.
The scope and length of this Article do not allow for a further
exploration of the four courses of action advanced in this Part.
Nevertheless, it is the Author's hope that this outline of preliminary
policy recommendations will provide useful insights into how we can
critically examine and reconceptualize the European Commission's
proposal for a new data producer's right for nonpersonal, anonymized
machine-generated data. To some extent, the discussion in this Part
highlights the immense complexities involved in developing a sound
and holistic data governance regime. The discussion also demonstrates
the interrelationship between different areas of law and policy.
VI. CONCLUSION

In October 2017, the European Commission advanced a proposal
for a new data producer's right. This proposal invites us to think more
deeply about the need to strengthen protection for nonpersonal,
anonymized machine-generated data. To critically examine this
proposal and to highlight the potential problems a similar proposal in
the United States would create, this Article revisits the past
developments surrounding sui generis database protection; examines
our present technological, business, scientific, and personal needs; and
identifies the complications the proposed right would generate in the
law and policy arena.
In doing so, this Article underscores the immense challenges for
developing a new data producer's right. Specifically, the proposal for
developing this new right has generated an expansive list of policy
questions and spill-over complications that policy makers will have to
consider before creating that right. Policy makers should therefore
undertake careful analysis and critical evaluation of this proposal.
Where possible, they should also work preemptively to ensure the
future development of a sound and holistic data governance regime.

